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Déo, 47 years old, originally from the province of Muramvya Province, told us 
her story.  
 
"My life has not been easy for some years. I have experienced three robberies, the 
death of my wife who left me with six children, including a six-month-old baby. It’s 
hard for me to get food and to pay the school fees. One day, I was in the province of 
Cibitoke. A friend gave me 15.000 Burundian Francs (Fbu) so that I could do some 
business selling rope made of sisal to try to earn a little money. People thought that 
I had a lot of money. I heard rumours that I was going to be attacked and spent 
several nights in the bush.  
 
One day, I said to my children that I was going to bed and that I would wake up 
later on to leave for the bush, at about 8 o’clock. That same night, at 7 o’clock, 
armed bandits attacked my house. I was sound asleep. They entered and demanded 
money. I gave them what I had. Despite that, they fired at me. I have an open 
wound  and fractured my femur (thigh bone). 
 
In the morning, the people from the church came and took me to the hospital in 
Gitega where I spent several months.  
 
The nurses finally asked me to pay a sum of money, although I had none. From that 
day, the nurses stopped treating me properly. My wound and fracture became 
infected. Nobody came to change the dressing. The nurses isolated me in a room so 
as to distance me from the other patients because my wound was purulent. The 
nurse only came to cover the wound. I was expecting to die. 
 
When I was in Gitega, a social worker from the Ministry of Social Affairs came to 
the hospital to give a voucher for medical care to a patient who had the same 
problem as me. She passed by the door of my isolation room, greeted me and asked, 
"How are you?" I explained my problem to her and she took pity on me. 
 
She took care of the preparations for my leaving and told me that she was going to 
go with me and the other patient to Bujumbura, to the MSF centre for the wounded 
where care is free. 
 
Now, I believe I will get better because the dressing is changed daily and I am also 
taking medicines." 
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Summary 
 
With a civil war that has endured for a decade, the Burundian population is living in 
a state of chronic crisis, characterized by the destruction of the economic and social 
fabric. The security situation has improved over recent months, but the effects of the 
war are still very much present. In order to improve the response to the needs of the 
population and to allow the actors involved in health policy in Burundi to acquire 
reliable data on the mortality and the access to health care within the country, 
MØdecins Sans FrontiŁres (MSF) conducted nationwide a retrospective 
epidemiological survey from November 2003 to January 2004. This survey focused 
on mortality rates, and financial access to, as well as utilisation of, primary health 
care centres across the country. 
 
Since February 2002, the Burundian government has been conducting a cost-
recovery policy, which in this case means a system where the patient must pay all of 
the costs of treatment, including medicines, as well as tests and medical acts (100% 
of the base cost). A complement of 15% is added to the cost price of the medicines; 
in theory this is intended to cover local additional expenses and compensate for 
those patients who are unable to pay. The government is supposed to intervene only 
for personnel salary payments and for financing infrastructure.  
 
Apart from this predominant system (almost five million people are concerned), two 
experiments have been attempted by Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
with the support of the Ministry of Health. One is a partial cost-recovery system of 
50%, meaning a system in which the patient pays half the price of medicines, plus 
the tests and medical acts. This system is only applied in the province of Makamba 
where around 220.000 people benefit. Another trial attempted in some provinces 
(Karuzi, Bujumbura Rural, Cankuzo and Ruyigi), with the support of some NGOs, 
including MØdecins Sans FrontiŁres, is the application of an all-inclusive flat fee. In 
these cases the patient pays a lump sum that covers the payment of medicines, 
medical acts and laboratory tests. Around 525.000 people benefit from this.  
 
All three systems were examined within the framework of this epidemiological 
survey. Three quantitative surveys of around 900 households were conducted and in 
total, more than 2.700 households were questioned. The two-degree cluster 
sampling method was used (30 clusters of 30). Certain complementary data were 
gathered from patients at the exit of the health centres, via technical cards, and 
through open interviews with the different actors concerned. The survey was limited 
to studying the financial access to health centres in rural districts.  
 
 
RESULTS OF THE SURVEY  
 
The effects of conflict  continue to have an impact on mortality 
•  Throughout the country the mortality rates are worrying. The crude morality 
rates for the three population groups surveyed (using the flat fee, cost 
sharing at 50% and cost recovery) are 1.2, 1.9 and 1.6 deaths per 10.000 
persons per day. These rates are higher than the threshold of  1 death per 
10.000 persons per day, and indicate an emergency situation. 
•  Children are particularly affected. The mortality rates for the under-fives are   6
                                                
way beyond the emergency threshold of 2 deaths per 10000 persons per day 
because in the three groups surveyed (flat fee, 50% cost sharing and cost 
recovery), these rates are 3.1, 4.9 and 3.3/10.000/day. In humanitarian 
contexts, such high mortality rates indicate a severe emergency situation. 
•  As a consequence of  the civil war that has affected the country for more 
than ten years, the main cause of the high mortality is infectious diseases. 
•  The first cause of mortality is malaria. With regard to this pathology, the 
mortality rates are significantly higher when patients have to pay more for 
consultations (cost sharing at 50% and cost recovery), as the specific 
mortality rates are 0.3/10.000/day for the ’flat fee’ system and 0.8/10.000/day 
for ’cost sharing’ and ’cost recovery’. 
 
 
No access to care for almost one million people 
•  The cost-recovery system excludes almost one million people from health 
care in Burundi, which is one-fifth of the population. In fact, with this 
system, 17.4% of sick people do not have access to care, mainly due to lack 
of money (81.7%). Even among patients who believe they are seriously ill, 
14.5% do not attend a consultation, mainly due to a lack of money. 
•  The sick have a tendency to wait too long before consulting, which worsens 
their illness and could in part explain the very high mortality rates. In fact, in 
the cost-recovery system, 36.2% of patients regard their state of health as 
’not very serious’ and do not consult, mainly due to the lack of money 
(58.7%). 
•  With the other two tariff systems, which alleviate the financial burden for 
patients, the exclusion rates remain considerable with the ’flat fee’ and ’cost-
sharing’ systems excluding respectively 9.3 and 9.6% of sick people. 
•  To this absolute exclusion must be added around 5% for the patients in all 
three systems who were able to pay for a consultation, but who did not have 
access to the medicines required, or who received an incomplete treatment. 
 
Resorting to extreme measures to pay for a consultation  
•  In the cost-recovery system, 81.5% of patients must take on a debt or sell a 
possession (harvest, land, livestock, etc.) in order to pay for health care. 
•  In the cost-sharing system, 74.6% of patients must still go into debt or sell a 
part of their production or assets in order to assume the cost of care. 
•  Only the flat fee system strongly reduces the proportion of patients obliged 
to go into debt or sell something (59%), but the figure remains nevertheless 
high.  
•  The only previously existing system that aided the mitigation of exclusion 
from care due to seasonal fluctuation in cash money (a system of pre-
payment via the Caisse d￿Assurance Maladie
1 ￿ CAM) is hardly functioning 
any more. For example, of the patients questioned at the exit of the health 
centres in the cost-recovery system, only 6% held this kind of card. 
 
Almost all of the rural population lives in absolute poverty and the healthcare 
expenses further exacerbate this poverty  
•  More than 99% of the population is living below the international threshold 
of extreme poverty, which stands at 1 USD per inhabitant per day. 
 
1 Health Insurance Office.   7
•  Between 85 and 90% of the population is living below the relative poverty 
threshold defined for Burundi, which is set at less than 1 USD per person per 
week. 
•  With the cost-recovery system, a single consultation in a primary health care 
centre is equivalent to more than 70% of a households’ weekly income. 
•  The two other systems reduce the primary health expenditure, but still 
represent a considerable sum and one that is difficult to pay, in case, for 
example, that two people fall ill in the same family. The flat fee payment 
represents 20% of a household’s weekly income, while the cost-sharing 
system represents 31% of this.  
•  Second-line expenses at the hospital are not included. 
 
There is no effective system to protect the poor  
•  In the cost-recovery system, less than 1% of patients leaving a health centre 
were in possession of a ’indigence card’. 
•  In the two other systems, the percentage of people receiving free care thanks 
to the ’indigence card’ increases (5.9 and 7.2% for the ’flat fee’ and ’cost-
sharing’ groups), but remains too low given the number of vulnerable people 
in Burundi and people living below the poverty threshold.  
•  The price reductions mainly benefit the holders of the health insurance 
(’mutuelle’) card for state employees, already privileged by the fact that they 
are earning a salary. 
 
 
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
•  A system of healthcare accessible to everyone 
 
Given the gravity of the situation, as much in terms of mortality and poverty as in 
exclusion from essential health care, MSF is committed to working towards free 
healthcare.  
 
•  Special attention to vulnerable people 
 
Specific attention must be paid to the most vulnerable people, as much with regard 
to the principles as to its implementation.  
 
•  A dialogue between all the actors concerned with financial access to 
care and the alternative ways of financing health services to avoid 
exclusion 
 
•  Information and follow-up on financial access 
 
Quantitative studies, with a few key questions, should be conducted regularly in 
order to obtain a better understanding of how the situation of exclusion is evolving 
and enable a reflection process regarding the most appropriate system to guarantee 
access to essential healthcare for Burundi. A survey should be held as rapidly as 
possible into the financial access problems at hospital level. 
 
•  Effective healthcare for the population 
   8
In order to ensure a genuine access to quality care adapted to the needs of the 
population, the link between the health service and population must be rethought 
and adapted 
   9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First of all, we thank the families, the patients and the whole Burundian population, 
who opened their doors wide to us and agreed to be interviewed. Without their 
contribution, this study could never have been conducted. 
 
We are grateful to Burundi’s Ministry of Public Health for its support, and we 
believe that the frank collaboration of the provincial doctors, heads of the health 
sector and managers of provincial offices, as well as the health staff in the health 
centres, were more than essential for the collection of data and the realisation of  the 
survey. 
 
We thank the governors and the administrative staff of the provinces for their 
support. We also thank all the government and non-government actors, national and 
international, who helped us in our work. We thank particularly the WHO 
representative in Bujumbura. We also owe particular thanks to ECHO for financing 
a part of this survey. 
 
We would also like to thank all the teams in the field with Action Contre La Faim, 
Handicap International, International Medical Corps, GVC, SolidaritØ, MSF-
Holland, MSF-Switzerland and MSF-France. They enabled us to complement the 
study with their data, their observations and their remarks and, thanks to their 
welcome and their logistics support, also facilitated our work in the field. 
 
We take this occasion to also thank Tara Neville for her tireless work of data 
collection, for ensuring support for the teams during the field survey and for her 
constant optimism. And not forgetting Patrick Wuilkin for his valuable contribution. 
 
Finally, a big ’thank you’ to the teams of interviewers and all the personnel of MSF-
Belgium who contributed to the survey.    10
 
PART ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT  
 
 
A.   GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
National environment 
The population of Burundi has been living for decades in a situation of chronic 
crisis. In 1993, the death of President Ndadaye triggered a major crisis that led to 
ten years of civil war. A peace process initiated in Arusha in 1998 concluded in a 
peace agreement signed in August 2000. The new government set up in November 
2001 is in charge of the transition period, which is foreseen to last for 36 months. 
  
This agreement was at first not accepted by the country’s main rebel factions, which 
continued the war. A ceasefire agreement was finally reached with one of the rebel 
movements in October 2003, which brought greater stability to the country, except 
in the province of Bujumbura Rural and sporadically in other provinces where 
another rebel group continues to operate. Ceasefire negotiations have been 
underway with this group since December 2003. 
 
The impact of this crisis on the socio-economic conditions of the population is 
enormous. Burundi is a symbol of ’the silent emergency’. The civil war ruined the 
local economy and dismantled the social services. Since the start of the civil war in 
1993, the development indicators have actually regressed. In 2002, Burundi’s 
ranking in the human development rating fell to the third lowest position in the 
world (171/173), which reflects the cumulative impact of most of the indicators. In 
terms of income, the GDP per inhabitant receded by an average of more than 20% 
between 1993 and 2002, dropping from 160 to 100 USD, a level far below the 
average of 490 USD in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2002). The gross national 
income per inhabitant was 100 USD in 2002.  
 
Other social and health indicators are just as unfavourable. The vaccination 
coverage has fallen from 83% in 1993 to 54% in 2002; the percentage of children 
attending primary school dropped from 70% in 1993 to 48% in 2002. The mortality 
rate for under-fives is 190 per 1.000 children. According to the estimates, since the 
war broke out, the hostilities have cost the lives of some 300.000 people, the 
majority of them civilians (UNDP, 2002). 
 
Some indicators describing the economic, social and health levels in Burundi compared with 
the rest of Africa and with the OECD countries 
 Burundi  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Low-income 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
Population (million)  6,9  674  2.511  1.122 
Urban population (%)  9  32  31  77,2 
Life expectancy at birth  42  47  59  68,5 
Infant mortality (per 1.000 live 
births)  
102 91  76  13 
Source:   World Bank, Burundi at a glance, 20 September 2002. 
  UNDP, Human Development Report 2003.  
  World Bank, World Development Report, 2004. 
  UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children, 2004.  
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International environment 
The Arusha Agreement for Burundi facilitated the resumption of discussions with 
the institutional donors on the possibility of resuming co-operation with these 
countries. Many promises were made during conferences in Paris (December 2000) 
and Geneva (November 2002), but could not be realised because of the insecurity 
that still prevailed within the country. Finally, a third donors’ conference was 
organised in Belgium in January 2004. Pledges were made to fund 810 million 
Euros, or 1.032 billion USD (final statement of the Forum of Partners for 
Development in Burundi, 15 January 2004). In addition, several countries have 
announced their intention to cancel some of Burundi￿s debts and debt repayment 
facilities have been agreed upon. 
 
 
B. HEALTH  SECTOR 
 
Background history 
Before the 1980s, Burundi’s health services were free of charge. But the inability of 
the government to offer primary health services because of financial problems led 
the country to introduce direct payment for healthcare services. A user fee is to be 
paid directly at the moment when healthcare is sought. 
 
A national pre-payment system was introduced in 1984 in the form of cards issued 
by the Caisse d’Assurance Maladie (CAM). The CAM card was bought by 
households and the owner of the card and his family received free care. This card is 
still circulating and gives the right to a reduction of 80% on healthcare prices. Since 
the introduction of the cost-recovery policy, however, it is no longer valid in most 
of the provinces of the country. In addition, in the places where it still operates, the 
administration’s management of the system is experiencing problems (Mcpake, B., 
Hanson, K., Mills, A., 1992). 
 
In 1988, the Burundian Ministry of Health carried out a reform and decentralisation 
policy. The main goals of this policy were: 
•  To increase the communities’ contribution to raise revenues for health-
services by the introduction of a payment system per consultation;  
•  To gradually implement a cost-recovery scheme in all the health 
structures; 
•  To establish management autonomy in the health structures at the 
provincial level; 
•  To create structures at  local level in order to facilitate dialogue and greater 
collaboration between the provincial level and local communities. 
 
This policy, which remains very general, took shape over the following years. In 
October 1999, a circular from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance 
announced the change in the pre-payment system and the introduction of direct 
payment for care at the health centres. The overall objective of this policy was to 
resolve the financial and management problems observed at the level of the health 
structures. Following the introduction of this user fee system, a new circular was 
published in January 2002 by the Ministry of Health announcing a donation of 
World Bank money within the framework of its programme of credits for 
emergencies and rehabilitation, and called on the provincial offices to start a ’cost-
recovery’ system (Save the Children, 2003).  
   12
The present health system and how it is financed 
The current national policy always refers to the Alma Ata statement and the 
principle of equity:  
 
"Burundi’s health policy will rely especially on the principle of ’health for all’ 
aiming at a greater health coverage and an equitable distribution of care (￿). 
Equity in the access to quality health services: this principle means that the MSP 
(MoH) will give each member of the community the same chances of acceding to 
quality health services. It will see that there is a fair distribution of resources 
between the regions and the different communities." (Burundian Ministry of Health, 
February 2002). 
 
By 2004, the Ministry of Public Health notably set itself two specific objectives 
(Ministry of Health, February 2002): 
-  To reduce the infant mortality rate by 50%; 
-  To reduce the maternal mortality rate by 50%. 
 
This policy presumes adequate resources. However, in its sectoral policy document, 
but also on the occasion of the consensus conference on the health committees in 
February 2002, the Ministry of Health acknowledged that there remained a problem 
in regard to financing its policy, as only 2.2% of the national budget was allocated 
to health in 2003. Since the civil war broke out in 1993, an analysis of the  national 
expenditure shows budget adjustments to the benefit of the defence sector and a 
relative lowering in social expenditure, even if the budget estimates granted to 
defence for 2003 are on the decline.  
 
Expenditure in the health sector and in the defence sector, 1997-2003 
  1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 
(est.) 
2003 
(est.) 
GDP at the market price (in 
billions of Burundian francs)  
342.8 400.2 455.5 511.1 550.0 ￿ 
Total expenditure (in billions of 
Burundian francs) 
74.9 92.8  115.4 124.1 147.7  183.5 
Health expenditure  (in billions 
of Burundian francs) 
2.1 2.5 2.7 2.8  3.7  4.1 
Health expenditure as a % of 
total expenditure 
2.8 2.7 2.3 2.3  2.5  2.2 
Health expenditure as a % of 
GDP 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5  0.7   
Military expenditure (in billions 
of Burundian francs) 
21.1 26.3 28.3 30.5  44.2  40.6 
Defence expenditure as a % of 
total expenditure 
28.8 28.3 24.5 24.6  29.9  22.1 
Source: IMF Statistics, the Burundi authorities and Fund Staff estimates 
 
Faced with this insufficient budget, the Ministry saw no other choice than to apply a 
cost-recovery policy to the health services. A World Bank table shows that out of 12 
relative dollars (PPP
2), spent on  health  per inhabitant for 1997-1998, the public 
sector covers 5 dollars (of which 1.55 comes from the Burundian government and 
                                                 
2  PPP or purchasing power parities: often called ￿international dollars’. This refers to health 
expenditure expressed as a unit that incorporates a country’s standard of living. For Burundi, 1 PPP 
corresponds to about 0.18 USD.   13
3.45 from external aid) and the private sector covers 7 dollars. Already at this time, 
the burden of health-related costs were mainly put on the patient. At the present 
time, this ratio is consolidating further. 
  
The lack of medical personnel also influences the health coverage and the quality of 
care. The table below clearly shows the decline in health coverage and health 
personnel since 1993. 
 
Coverage by medical personnel 
 
 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
N￿ of inhabitants per doctor (measured in 
1.000s) 
25.2 18.3 19.5 22.3 34.7 
N￿ of inhabitants per nurse (measured in 
1.000s) 
3.8 3.2 3.4 2.6 3.3 
 
As of February 2002, the cost-recovery system for primary care was in place 
everywhere in the country, but its implementation was rather loose and 
heterogeneous. In a general manner, we could say that in the health centres, 100% 
or more of the cost of medicines are payable by the patient, based on the official 
price set by the Centrale d￿Achat Officielle du Burundi
3 (CAMEBU). On top of 
this, the consultation, medical acts, overnight stay and medical material also have to 
be paid for, with the prices set by the Bureau Provincial de la SantØ
4 (BPS).  
 
Since 2003, the government  has favoured a community participation policy through 
the creation of health committees (consensus conference on this issue in February 
2003). 
 
The tariff-setting system is different in the so-called ￿centres agrØes￿, meaning the 
private centres supported by a religious network, mainly the Catholic Church, but 
approved by the state authorities. As the personnel in these centres are not paid by 
the state and the subsidies are too small to cover the costs, these centres practise a 
cost recovery policy of 150%. The patient therefore pays for the consultation, the 
medical acts, overnight stay and 150% of the price of medicines, which are 
purchased via the regional offices, not only from CAMEBU, but also from other 
private suppliers. 
 
The government has granted significant operational autonomy to the provincial 
authorities by allowing them to conclude collaboration agreements directly with 
certain NGOs that advocate either a symbolic participation by the population, or 
cost-sharing, provided that a large part of the costs of the system are carried by the 
NGO concerned. It is within this framework that different provinces of the country, 
with the collaboration of international NGOs (MSF and GVC), are implementing a 
flat fee system in some or all of their health centres (Cankuzo, Bujumbura Rural, 
Makamba and Ruyigi), with an all-inclusive fee ranging from 50 to 300 Fbu. The 
patients pay this fixed amount for the consultation, medical acts and medicines. 
 
Another medical NGO, Cordaid, funded by ECHO, practises a cost-sharing system 
of 50% in the province of Makamba. This means that the patients pay for the 
                                                 
3 The official office for purchasing medicines. 
4 The Provincial Health Office.   14
consultation, medical acts and 50% of the official CAMEBU price for medicines; 
the difference in the cost of medicines is subsidised by ECHO via Cordaid. 
 
The opinion on these various payment policies varies largely according to different 
interlocutors. Some declare that the consultation rates have dropped dramatically 
since the introduction of the cost-recovery policy and that most of the population no 
longer has access to health care. Others emphasize that a large majority of the 
population continues to have access to care and that population groups that drop out 
of this system will benefit from free care thanks to the ’indigence cards’. 
 
However, apart from the survey carried out by Save The Children in the provinces 
of Gitega, Muramvya and Mwaro (Save the Children, 2003), no reliable quantitative 
data are available  to explain how the population  is dealing with their health 
problems. Nor has it ever been determined whether the government’s current policy 
on cost recovery is realistic and feasible, in the short- and medium-term, taking into 
account its principal objective, namely access to health care for all.  
  
Hence there is a clear need for accurate and objective data in order to confirm or 
invalidate the hypothesis that the system of cost recovery has a negative impact on 
the population’s access to health care and to ascertain whether a change in the 
system for paying for health services should be adopted in Burundi. It is in order to 
answer this question that MSF decided to conduct a country-wide epidemiological 
survey.   15
PART TWO 
 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This section presents the objectives in detail, the underlying hypotheses and the 
methodology utilized by MSF in conducting this country-wide survey.  
 
 
A. OBJECTIVES 
 
The general objective of the survey was to measure the financial access to primary 
health care according to the payment systems generally applied in Burundi’s health 
centres.  
 
The more specific objectives pursued were: 
 
1.  To describe the health structures concerned and the different methods of 
financial participation in existence. 
2.  To establish the proportion of patients living in proximity to a health centre 
and using this centre, according to the payment system in place. 
3.  To collect data relative to the quality of the care provided in the health 
centres (HC). 
4.  To measure the mortality of the civilian population of Burundi. 
5.  To collect data providing indications about the income and expenditure of 
the population, as well as the coping mechanisms employed by households 
in order to deal with health-related expenditure. 
 
These data should enable the political decision-makers, humanitarian actors and 
medical staff to acquire reliable information on access to care in order to improve 
the response to the needs of the population and to provide objective guidance in 
their initiatives.  
 
This information will also make it possible to measure the limits of MSF’s projects 
supporting primary health care and reorient its programmes, if necessary. 
 
 
B. HYPOTHESES 
 
Principal hypotheses  
 
•  A large proportion of the population of Burundi does not have access to 
health care because of the prohibitive costs in the cost-recovery system. For 
the country overall, the degree of exclusion from primary services (health 
centre/HC) for financial reasons is around 20%. 
•  The degree of non-utilisation differs significantly according to the type of 
tariff system. 
 
Secondary hypotheses 
 
•  Where the tariff level corresponds to a cost recovery of more than 50%, this 
implies a global exclusion of more than 20%.   16
•  The flat fee and cost-sharing systems increase financial access to health care. 
•  The degree of exclusion is higher in tariff systems that charge per unit than 
in those charging a flat fee. 
•  The proportion of very poor households, although this varies from one 
province to another, is still very high in Burundi. The degree of exclusion of 
the poorest patients would be proportionately even higher.   
•  Globally, and particularly during several months of the year, poor 
households do not have sufficient cash money to pay for health care and are 
obliged to incur a debt. 
•  The flat fee protects the poorest patients from exclusion from primary care. 
•  The flat fee protects patients from incomplete treatments. 
•  The total price the patient has to pay does not correspond to the formal tariff 
in place. 
•  The flat fee means the patient has better knowledge of the price to be paid. 
 
 
C. METHODS 
 
With regard to the objectives of the research, several quantitative and qualitative 
techniques were adopted. A pre-survey was organised in order to categorize the 
health centres according to the tariff system practised. On the basis of this 
categorization, a household survey was organised in each category. The data was 
completed by the addition of two types of investigation: semi-open  interviews with 
key actors in the system and ’patient questionnaires’ at the exit of the health centres. 
The table below explains which type of information was collected by each of the 
investigation methods. 
 
 
Type of information  Population 
survey 
Exit survey 
(patients at the 
exit of the health 
centre) 
Information at 
the level of the 
health centre 
Socio-economic information about 
users and non-users 
Categorization 
by  socio-
economic class 
Categorization by 
socio-economic 
class  
 
Degree of non-utilisation  XXX    
Financial reasons for the non-
utilisation 
XXX    
Constraints/financial obstacles for 
users  
XXX XXX   
Negative effects and coping 
mechanisms  in order to pay for care  
(users) 
XXX XXX   
Financial constraints on the quality 
of care (complete treatment, choice 
and dosage of medicines, etc.) 
XXX XXX XXX 
The real total price to be paid by the 
user 
XX XXX   
The patient’s knowledge of the price 
to be paid 
 XXX  
The mechanisms for exemption or 
the price reductions available, and 
who benefits 
XX XXX XX 
The functioning of the exemption 
system for the poor 
XX XXX  X   17
Quality and type of care offered 
(including the availability of 
medicines, quality of diagnosis and 
treatment, temperature-taking, 
physical examination, offer of 
vaccination, length of consultation) 
 XX  XXX 
Satisfaction regarding the quality of 
care (waiting time, reception, etc.) 
 XXX  
Tariff mechanisms in place   XX  XXX 
 
The survey was directed only towards the access to care in the health centres, and 
not in the hospitals. As the objective of the study was to analyse the access to 
primary health care, we preferred to limit ourselves to the health centres, with or 
without hospitalisation beds.  
 
It was also decided not to include Bujumbura Mairie for reasons related to the 
homogeneity of the population to be studied. In a rural setting, the poverty rates are 
even higher than in an urban setting. This does not mean that there are no problems 
of financial access in Bujumbura. A survey in an urban setting would have required 
other methods of investigation. 
 
It was decided that the survey would be directed only towards the public health 
centres and the private religious health centres. It was considered that it would be 
difficult to identify purely private (for profit) health centres when these were not 
legally recognised. In addition, these private centres do not have public health 
objectives, but instead pursue lucrative goals. And finally, there are not very many 
of them in Burundi, except in the capital Bujumbura, which is not included in the 
survey. 
 
Pre-survey 
 
The health map for Burundi is not complete. It was therefore impossible to proceed 
with a categorization of the public and private religious health centres according to 
the type of tariff-setting system employed without a prior survey. This survey took 
place from September to October 2003. The 16 provinces of Burundi (the whole of 
the country, except Bujumbura Mairie) were investigated and different information 
was gathered from the administrative and health authorities, as well as from 
different NGOs: security, population displacements, population figures, list of 
health structures, their locality, type of care, type of tariff-setting system and 
catchment areas. In this way, a health map could be prepared. 374 public or private 
religious health centres were counted with 47 public health centres applying a flat 
fee (Family A), 19 public health centres applying a cost-sharing system of 50% of 
the price of medicines (Family B) and 308 health centres (234 public and 74 
approved) applying a cost-recovery system of 100 to 150% of the price of 
medicines (Family C). Also listed was the number of private, non-approved health 
centres, as well as health centres under construction or not functioning. 
 
Household surveys 
 
Division of the country according to the tariff-setting system 
The ’cost-recovery’ group represents the majority system in the country as 4.922.241 
people, or around 80% of the inhabitants of Burundi, fall under it. The two other 
groups constitute an exception to this generalised system, an exception agreed by 
the Ministry of Health.    18
The flat fee system is utilised in parts of five provinces: Cankuzo, Karuzi, Ruyigi, 
Makamba and Bujumbura Rural (MSF supports health projects in these five 
provinces). There are 526.401 beneficiaries in this system.  
 
Finally, the cost-sharing system (50% cost recovery for the drugs) functions only in 
the province of Makamba, in the health centres supported by Cordaid. There are 
221.413 beneficiaries in this system.  
 
Calculation of the sample size 
 
Cluster sampling at two levels was chosen for each tariff-setting group. The size of 
the sample was calculated based on a percentage of access of 75% for the cost-
recovery system (family C) and 85% for the flat fee system (family A). In order to 
be able to differentiate between the two, the margin of error was fixed at more or 
less 4% (with an alpha risk of 0.05 and beta of 0.2). the cluster effect expected was 
estimated at 2. In this way, for each group, 876 households with at least one ill 
member were required. Hence 30 clusters of 30 households. 
 
For each list (A,B,C) established during the pre-survey, the allocation of clusters 
was made by systematic sampling proportional to the size of the population covered 
by each health centre (cf. intra). 
 
The retrospective period studied for the mortality survey was three months. 
 
Identification of the sample and the field 
Three types of health centre (Families A, B, C) are compared in the survey 
according to their tariff-setting system: 
-  Family A: flat fee (final list in annex 2); 
-  Family B: proportional cost-sharing system at 50% (final list in annex 3); 
-  Family C: cost-recovery system at 100 to 150% (final list in annex 4). 
 
In each group, covering the whole of the country, with the exception of the capital, 
the health-centre catchment areas were chosen at random. For security reasons the 
survey teams could not visit certain geographic zones in the groups A and C; these 
were withdrawn from the study. They comprised a large part of the province of 
Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, as well as a small part of the province of Cibitoke. 
It should be noted that during this period, the security situation in these provinces 
was volatile and as such it was decided that for safety reasons they should be 
excluded. It was therefore impossible to plan in advance, unless the whole of a 
province was to be excluded. The following communes of the province of 
Bujumbura Rural were entirely excluded: Muhuta, Kabezi, Bugarama, Isale, 
Mubimbi, Kanyosha, Mutambu and Nyabiraba. The communes of Mutimbuzi and 
Mukike were partially excluded. In the province of Bubanza, three communes were 
totally excluded (Mpanda, Gihanga and Rugazi) and two partially excluded 
(Bubanza and Musigati). In the province of Cibitoke, four communes were totally 
excluded (Mugira, Murwi, Mabayi and Bukiranyana). Finally, in the province of 
Bururi, two communes were totally excluded for security reasons. These were 
Burambi and Buyengero. 
 
 
 
Distribution of the clusters in Group A   19
Province  Population covered by 
the HC of Group A 
% Number  of 
clusters 
Cankuzo 58.105  11.0% 3 
Karuzi 224.834  42.7%  13 
Ruyigi 109.440  20.  8% 6 
Makamba 48.217 9.  2%  3 
Bujumbura Rural  85.805  16.3%  5 
Total 930.424    30 
 
Distribution of the clusters in Group B 
Province  Sector  Population covered by 
the HC of Group A 
% Number  of 
clusters 
Makamba Makamba  125.861  80.67%  19 
  Nyanza-Lac 30.166  19.33%  11 
Total   156.027    30 
 
 
Distribution of the clusters in Group C 
Province Population  covered 
by the HC of Group C
% Number  of 
clusters 
Cankuzo 139.248 2.8%  1 
Karuzi 745.26  1.5% 0 
Ruyigi 193.435  3.9%  1 
Kayanza 482.763 9.8%  3 
Mwaro 283.804  5.  8% 2 
Cibitoke 107.320  2.  2%  1 
Kirundo 575.571  11.  7% 4 
Rutana 214.400  4.  4% 1 
Muyinga 402.677 8.  2%  3 
Ngozi 677.901  13.8% 4 
Muramvya 349.516  7.1%  2 
Makamba 66.076 1.3%  0 
Bujumbura Rural  37.251  0. 8%  0 
Bubanza 75.782 1.5%  0 
Burui 444.463  9.0% 3 
Gitega 797.508  16.2% 5 
Total 5.364.011    30 
 
 
For each province, the population covered by the health centres of the category 
concerned was calculated and the number of clusters required in the province was 
calculated in proportion to this population. Finally, within the province, the locality 
of each cluster was randomly selected in proportion to the populations of the health-
centre catchment areas.  
 
In order to concentrate on  financial access, the households surveyed were selected 
from among the population living at a distance of less than 5 km from the reference 
health centre. This made it possible to minimise the problems related to geographic 
access and focus on the other reasons for exclusion, particularly those linked with 
problems of financial access. 
 
There are no villages in Burundi. The population lives dispersed on the hills. The 
hills were selected at random, a hill corresponding to a direction in the so-called   20
’bottle’ methodology: once on a hill, the different directions (groups of houses) were 
selected at random. Using the table of random numbers, the interviewers randomly 
selected a house and began the survey with that house. They continued the survey 
with the second house closest to it, and so on.  
 
On average, eight two-person teams were selected on the basis of their capacities, 
their knowledge of the field and their fluency in French and Kirundi. These teams 
received specific training on the methodology and the procedures employed and 
went through a pre-test period. They were monitored by at least four supervisors, 
headed by a general coordinator. 
 
The questionnaire comprised of 24 closed questions on the composition of the 
household, the mortality, the morbidity, the financial access to care and the socio-
economic situation of the households (questionnaire included in the annexes). The 
questionnaire was translated into Kirundi and tested beforehand. Contrary to the 
survey on mortality and the survey on the socio-economic situation of the 
household, the questions relating to the access to care concerned only the 
households where at least one person had been taken ill in the course of the 
preceding three months. If there had been more than one ill person in the household 
during this period, the questionnaire applied to the most recent episode.  
 
The household was selected for the sample and not the family, as the latter can be 
understood in the wide sense of the term (extended family) and comprises members 
who do not necessarily all live under the same roof. Talking about family members 
who do not share the everyday life of the person interviewed could have biased the 
data  (precision in answering and memory problems). The following definition was 
used for a household: people who sleep under the same roof at least three days per 
week. Depending on the type of habitation and the social codes, a household could 
be comprised of: brothers, sisters and their nuclear families, second and more wives 
if polygamous, an adopted cousin, etc. 
 
Analysis of the data 
The data were encoded on a daily and/or weekly basis in the Epi Info 6.04 fr 
programme and checked on return by the field supervisors. The analysis was made 
in Brussels. 
 
 
User survey of patients at the exit of a health centre 
 
In each tariff-setting group (A, B and C) and for each cluster chosen in the sample, 
15 patients were questioned as they left the health centre. A total of three times 450 
interviews were therefore carried out. A semi-open questionnaire comprised of 28 
questions related to the financial access to care, the quality of care and the socio-
economic situation of the patient (questionnaire used for patients at the exit of the 
health centres can be found in the annexes). 
 
This survey was conducted by teams of four to twelve medically-trained people, 
headed by four supervisors. Training and pre-testing of the questionnaire were 
undertaken. 
 
 
Information gathered at the level of the focal HC for the cluster    21
 
Information was gathered from each health centre selected at random. In total, 72 
health centres were visited. The information card (semi-open questionnaire) was 
comprised of 11 questions relative to the population using it, the tariff system, the 
number of curative consultations, the availability of medicines, and the quality of 
care. 
 
Only the four survey supervisors participated in the collection of this information.  
 
 
Interviews for each province 
 
Open interviews were held with different types of interlocutor: e.g. the governor, 
provincial health authorities, head of health sector, head nurse of the health centre, 
health centre manager, hospital administrator, medical coordinator of the diocesan 
office and NGOs. Experienced personnel gathered the information provided by 
these different health actors.   22
 
PART THREE 
 
RESULTS OF THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY  
 
 
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
 
In total, 2.866 households were interviewed (955 for Group A, 944 for Group B and 
967 for Group C). For families with no sick member in the three months preceding 
the survey, only the questionnaire relative to the composition of the family and the 
mortality was completed. 
 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Composition  
of households 
Number of people  Number of people  Number of people 
< 5 years  831 (15.7%)  872 (16.6%)  905 (16.7%) 
5-14 years  1.682 (31.8%)  1.641 (31.2%)  1.797 (33.2%) 
15-50 years  2.463 (46.6%)  2.439 (46.4%)  2.380 (43.9%) 
> 50 years  308 (5.8%)  304 (5.8%)  333 (6.1%) 
Total 5284  5256 5418 
NB: Average n￿ 
people/family 
5.5 5.6  5.7 
 
The composition of the families of the three groups is similar. The three groups 
have a high percentage of households without children under 5 years: 378 
households (= 39.6%) for Group A, 381 households (= 39.6%) for Group B and 404 
households (= 41.8%) for Group C. 227 households (= 23.8%) comprising at least 
one person over 50 years, in Group A, 223 households (= 23.6%) in Group B and 
219 households (= 22.6%) in Group C.  
 
 
II. RETROSPECTIVE MORTALITY 
 
The retrospective mortality survey was conducted over a period of three months.  
 
1. Global mortality  
 
Mortality in absolute values  
Age bracket  Group C  Group B  Group A 
00-59 months  25  39  26 
05-14 years  13  19  7 
15-50 years  34  28  21 
51 years and over  5  3  6 
Total 77  89  60 
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Mortality rate by category 
Age bracket  Group C 
(deaths/10.000/day  
and 95% CI*) 
Group B 
(deaths/10.000/day  
and 95% CI) 
Group A 
(deaths/10.000/day  
and 95% CI) 
Crude 
mortality rate 
1.6     [1.2-2.0] 
 
1.9     [1.4-2.3] 
 
1.2     [0.8-1.6] 
 
Mortality rate  
< 5 years 
3.3     [2.0-4.6] 
 
4.9     [3.4-6.3] 
 
3.1     [2.3-4.0] 
 
Mortality rate  
> 5 years 
1.3      [0.9-1.6]  1.3     [1.0-1.6]  0.8     [0.6-1.0] 
05-14 years  0.9      [0.4-1.3]  1.3       [0.7-1.8]  0.4     [0.2-0.7] 
15-50 years  1.5      [1.0-2.1]  1.3        [0. 9-1.7]  1.0      [0.7-1.3] 
51 years and 
over  
1.8      [0.0-3.5]  1.1       [0.0-2.2]  2.0     [1.0-3.0] 
* CI = confidence interval 
 
There is no significant statistical difference between the three groups. 
  
 
2. Specific mortality (per 10.000/day) 
 
  C (n = 77)     B (n = 89)    A (n = 60)         
Malaria or fever  37 = 0.8 [0.5 – 1.0]      36 = 0.8 [0.5 – 1.0]         15 = 0.3 [0.2 – 0.5] 
Respiratory condition     5 = 0.1 [0.0 ￿ 0.2]    5 = 0.1 [0.0 ￿ 0.2]  11 = 0.2 [0.1 ￿ 0.4] 
Diarrhoea  8 = 0.2 [0.0 ￿ 0.3]        12 = 0.3 [0.1￿ 0.4]  10 = 0.2 [0.1 ￿ 0.3] 
Other  27 = 0.6 [0.3 ￿ 0.8]        36 = 0.8 [0.5 ￿ 1.0]         24 = 0.5 [0.3 ￿ 0.7]     
 
The mortality due to malaria or fever is significantly higher in Groups B and C 
compared with Group A (p < 0.05). 
 
 
III. MORBIDITY 
 
Within households chosen at random, the interviewer asked if one or more people 
had been ill during the past three months. If there were several of them, the person 
who had most recently been ill was questioned. 
 
1.Description of the sample 
 
1.1 Number of families with at least one person sick during the preceding three 
months  
 
Number of families having with at least one sick member during the preceding three 
months  
Group C  Group B  Group A 
941 
97.3% [96.1-98.5] 
924 
97.9% [96.9-98.9] 
903 
94.6% [92.7-96.4] 
 
 
1.2 Composition of families with a sick member  
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   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Composition of 
households 
N￿ of people  N￿ of people  N￿ of people 
< 5 years  802 (15.6%)  854 (16.6%)  871 (16.8%) 
5-14 years  1.642 (31.9%)  1600 (31.1%)  1.692 (33.0%) 
15-50 years  2.395 (46.6%)  2.392 (46.4%)  2.251 (43.5%) 
> 50 years  302 (5.9%)  298 (5.8%)  315 (6.1%) 
Total 5141  5.148  5.418 
NB: Average n￿ of 
people/family 
5.5 5.6  5.7 
 
The composition of the households is similar to that of the total sample, as is the 
percentage of households with no children aged below 5 years (38.6%, 40% and 
42.1% respectively) and of households with elderly members (23.5%, 23.6% and 
22.7% respectively).  
 
 
2. Gravity of the illness and type of treatment 
 
2.1 Gravity of the illness 
 
   Group C   Group B  Group A 
Gravity Fr.  %  95%  CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Serious  813 86.5 [83.2-89.8] 760 82.4 [77.6-87.3] 687 77.2  [72.6-81.8] 
Not very 
serious 
127 13.5 [10.2-16.8] 162 17.6 [12.7-22.4]  203  22.8 [18.2-27.4] 
TOTAL*  940  100  922  100   890  100  
 * Missing data: 13 for Group A, 2 for Group B and 1 for Group C. 
 
The proportion of sick people who felt their illness to be serious is greater in Groups 
B and C than in Group A. This tendency is statistically significant (p<0.05). 
 
2.2 Type of treatment  
  
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Type of treatment  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Traditional products  28  3.0  [1.4-4.6]  6  0.6  [0.1- 1.2]  21  2.3  [1.3-3.3] 
’Modern’ medicine+/- 
Traditional products 
761 80.9 [77.2-84.5] 834 90.3 [87.6-92.9] 806 89.3 [86.6-91.9] 
Without medication  152  16.2 [13.019.3]  84  9.1  [6.5-11.7]  76  8.4  [5.9-11.0] 
TOTAL  941  100  924 100  903  100  
  
The total ’cost-recovery’ group (group C) has a significantly higher proportion of 
sick people taking no medication (16.2% against 8.4 and 9.1 respectively for 
Groups A and B) and a significantly lower proportion of people who took modern 
medicines (80.9% against 89.3 and 90.3 respectively for Groups A and B) (p<0.05). 
 
2.3 Type of treatment according to the gravity experienced 
 
2.3.1 People who felt they were seriously ill 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Type of treatment  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Traditional products  20  2.5  [0.9 ￿ 4.0]  3  0.4  [0.0- 0.8]  16  2.3  [1.3 ￿ 3.4] 
’Modern’ medicine+/- 683  84.0 [80.5 - 87.5] 697  91.7 [89.2 ￿94.3]  619  90.1  [87.2￿93.0]   25
Traditional products 
Without medication  110  13.5 [10.5 ￿ 16.5] 60  7.9  [5.4 ￿ 10.4]  52  7.6  [5.9-11.0] 
TOTAL 813  100    760  100    687  100   
  
2.3.1 People who felt they were not seriously ill 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Type of treatment  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Traditional products  8  6.3  [3.1 ￿ 9.5]  3  1.9  [0.0- 4.3]  5  2.5  [0.4 ￿ 4.6] 
’Modern’ medicine+/- 
Traditional products 
77  60.6 [52.0 ￿ 69.3] 135  83.3 [76.8￿ 89.9]  174  85.7  [80.2 ￿ 91.2] 
Without medication  42  33.1 [24.3 ￿ 41.8] 24  14.8 [7.7 ￿ 21.9]  24  11.8  [7.0 ￿ 16.6] 
TOTAL 127  100    162  100    203  100   
  
When we stratify according to the gravity of the illness, this difference remains 
significant (p<0.05) for people who felt they were not seriously ill and is at the limit 
of significance for those who felt they were seriously ill. 
 
3. Types of illness 
 
In the three groups (903, 924 and 942 patients), the majority of people attended a 
consultation because they suspected malaria or fever. 
 
Group  C:   60.9 %   CI [55.8-66.0] 
Group  B:   60.9 %   CI [56.8-65.0] 
Group  A:   56.3 %   CI [51.0-61.7] 
 
 
IV. ACCESS TO CARE 
 
1. Consultation 
 
1.1 Out of the total (n = 2768) 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Had 
consulted:  
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
 No  164  17.4  [14.0-20.8]  89  9.6  [6.7-12.5]  84 9.3  [7.0-9.5] 
 Yes  777  82.6  [79.2-86.0]  83.5  90.4  [87.5 ￿ 93.3] 819 90.7  [88.4-93.0] 
 TOTAL   941  100     924  100     903  100     
  
Between 14 and 20.8% of sick people in Group C did not attend a consultation. This 
is significantly higher than for Groups A and B  (p<0.05). 
  
1.2 Among the seriously ill (n = 2260) 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Had 
consulted: 
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
No  118  14.5 [11.4 ￿ 17.6] 63  8.3  [5.4 ￿ 11.1] 55  8.0  [5.4 ￿ 10.6] 
Yes  695  85.5 [82.4 ￿ 88.6] 697 91.7 [88.9 ￿ 94.6] 632 92  [89.4 ￿ 94.6] 
 TOTAL   813  100     760  100     687  100    
  
1.3 Among those not seriously ill (n = 492) 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Had 
consulted: 
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI   26
No  46  36.2  [27.1 ￿ 45.3] 26 16.0  [9.2 ￿ 22.3] 29 14.3  [9.5 ￿ 19.1] 
Yes  81  63.8  [54.7 ￿ 72.9] 136 84.0  [77.1 ￿ 90.8] 174 85.7  [80.9 ￿ 90.5] 
TOTAL  127  100     162  100     203  100     
  
The number of people who did not attend a consultation in Group C represents 
almost double those who did consult in Groups A and B, no matter how ill they 
perceived themselves to be (p<0.05). 
 
Reasons for not seeking a consultation 
 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Reasons for not seeking 
a consultation 
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr. %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Not sufficiently ill  19  11.6  [5.8 ￿ 17.4] 9  10.1 [4.0 ￿ 16.2] 13  15.5  [6.3-24.6] 
Lack of money  134  81.7  [75.0 ￿ 88.4] 68  76.4 [67.6 ￿ 85.2] 61  72.6  [61.1-84.1]
Other reasons  11  6.7  [2.2 ￿ 2.4]  12  13.5 [6.6 ￿ 20.4] 10  11.9  [2.8 ￿ 21.0]
TOTAL  164  100  89  100  84  100   
  
The main reason why the person did not attend a consultation is the lack of money, 
but a considerable percentage of sick people did not consult because they 
considered that the illness was not sufficiently serious to require a consultation 
(between 10 and 15% depending on the group).  
 
1.4 Among those regarding themselves as seriously ill (n = 236) 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Had not 
consulted: 
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr. %  95% CI  Fr. %  95% CI 
Lack of money  107  90.7  [84.8 ￿ 96.6] 54  85.1 [77.2 ￿ 94.2] 43  78.2  [65.6 ￿ 90.8] 
Other reasons  11  9.3  [3.4 ￿ 15.2] 9  14.3 [5.8 ￿ 22.8] 12  21.8  [9.2 - 34.4] 
TOTAL  118 100    63 100    55 100   
  
Although the difference is not significant, we can note a growing tendency among 
the three groups regarding the proportion of people not consulting because of a lack 
of money. 
 
1.5 Among people who considered themselves to be only slightly ill (n = 101) 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Had not 
consulted:  
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
 Lack of 
money 
27  58.7  [43.7 ￿ 73.7] 14 53.8  [37.6 ￿ 70.0]]  18 62.1  [39.6 ￿ 84.4]
 Other reasons  19  41.3  [26.3 ￿ 56.3] 12 46.2  [30.0 ￿ 62.4]  11 37.9  [15.6 ￿ 60.2]
 TOTAL   46  100     26  100     29  100     
  
The other reasons for not consulting are described as: "a lack of transport or the 
health centre considered too far away", "the security problems", "the health centre 
has no medicines", "the waiting time is too long at the HC", "a lack of confidence in 
the personnel of the HC", "HC personnel absent", "money owed to the HC", "the 
sick person considered to be incurable", "the family turned to prayer" or "already 
had medicines". 
 
2. Primary care received 
   27
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Place of 
consultation 
Fr. %  95%  CI  Fr. %  95%  CI  Fr. %  95%  CI 
HC chosen  573 73.7  [67.6 ￿ 79.9] 626 75.0 [66.9 ￿ 83.1] 642 78.4  [72.2 ￿ 84.5]
Other HC  112 14.4  [9.0 ￿ 19.8] 110 13.2 [7.9 ￿ 18.5] 109 13.3  [8.1 ￿ 18.5]
Hospital  40  5.1  2.6 ￿ 7.7]  41  4.9  [2.8 ￿ 7.0]  24  2.9  [0.9 ￿ 5.0] 
Other  52  6.7  4.5 ￿ 8.9]  58  6.9  [3.8 ￿ 10.1] 44  5.4  [3.1 ￿ 7.6] 
Total 777 100  835 100  819 100  
  
2.1 Overnight stay  
 
Type of 
tariff 
N =   Overnight 
stay in a HC 
Overnight stay 
in a hospital 
Total (overnight stay 
either in HC or 
hospital) 
95% CI 
Group C  777  78 (11,4%)  40 (5,1%)  118 (15,2%)  [10.0 ￿ 20.4]
Group B  835  71 (9,6)  41 (4,9%)  112 (13,4%)  [10.0 ￿ 16.8]
Group A  819  47 (6,3%)  24 (2,9%)  71 (8,7%)  [5.4 ￿ 11.9] 
 
In Group A, fewer people spent a night in the HC (health centre) or went to the 
hospital. This difference is at the limit of significance (p<0.05) 
 
2.2 Treatment prescribed and received  
 
The following data was calculated for patients who consulted in the nearest HC .  
 
2.2.1 Laboratory 
 
  Group C (n = 655)  Group B (n = 663)  Group A (n = 642) 
Laboratory  Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI 
Prescribed  216  37.7  [27.6 ￿ 47.8] 372 59.5  [52.9 ￿ 66.1] 170 26.5  [19.2 ￿ 33.7] 
Actually 
performed* 
209  96.8  [93.4 - 100] 335 90.1  [85.2 ￿ 94.9] 168 98.8  [96.5 ￿ 100] 
 *   The % represents the proportion of prescribed tests actually performed (n = prescribed tests).  
 
Significantly more tests were prescribed in Group B than in the 2 other groups, 
although there was a general tendency to perform fewer. 
 
Reasons why the test was not performed: 
In Group A, the failure to perform 2 tests was due to a lack of money or lack of 
availability of the test in the laboratory. In Group B, the failure to perform the tests 
(37 tests) was mainly due to the lack of availability of the test or a laboratory (19 
tests, or 51.3 %) and then to a lack of money (16 tests, or 43.2 %). In Group C, of 
the 7 tests not performed, 4 (57.1%) were due to the lack of a laboratory at the HC 
and 3 (42.9%) to a lack of money. 
It is astonishing to observe how many tests were prescribed in Group B, although 
they were not available. 
 
2.2.2 Treatments 
 
 
  Group C  Group B  Group A   28
Treatments:  Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI 
Prescribed  573  99.6  [99.2 - 100] 626 99.4  [98.6 - 100] 637 99.2  [98.6 ￿ 99.9] 
Received 
completely 
543  95.3  [93.4 ￿ 97.1] 588 94.5  [92.6 ￿ 96.6] 611 95.9  [94.1 ￿ 97.7] 
 
Received 
completely at 
the HC 
539  99.3  [98.4 ￿ 100] 571 97.4  [95.7 ￿ 99.1] 594 97.2  [95.4 ￿ 99.0] 
 
The percentage of treatments prescribed and received completely is similar for the 
three groups. 
 
 
Reasons for failure to provide prescribed tests 
 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
  Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI 
Treatments received 
partially or not at all  
27  4.8  [2.9 ￿ 6.6]  34  5.4  [3.4 ￿ 7.4]  26  4.1  [2.3 ￿ 5.9] 
Reasons:                
Lack of money  17  63.0  [45.6 ￿ 80.3] 17  50.0  [34.3 ￿ 65.7] 8  30.8  [9.4 ￿ 52.1]
Not available  10  37.0  [19.7 ￿ 54.4] 16  47.1  [28.5 ￿ 65.6] 15  57.7  [36.4 ￿ 79.0]
Don’t know/other   0  0    1  2.9  [0.0 ￿ 8.4]  3  11.5  [0.0 ￿ 25.0]
  
About 4% of patients receiving a prescription for medicines did not receive a 
complete treatment. In Group A, the main reason for not receiving part or all of the 
treatment was its non-availability in the health centre selected or elsewhere (57.7%). 
In groups B and C, the main reason was the patients’ lack of money (50 and 63% 
respectively). 
 
Summary of points 1 and 2 
 
The following table summarises the percentage of patients (from among those who 
considered a consultation necessary
5) having access to a consultation and receiving 
a complete treatment in the HC selected: 
 
Percentage of patients with access to a consultation and receiving a complete 
treatment in  the HC selected: 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Access to a complete 
treatment 
Fr.  %  95%  CI Fr. % 95%  CI Fr.  %  95%  CI 
Yes    539 58 [52-65] 571  62  [55-70] 594  67  [60-73] 
No  383 42 [35-48] 344  37  [30-45] 296  33  [27-40] 
TOTAL    100          100   
 
3. Price paid for care or linked to care   
 
The following data are calculated for the people who attended the HC selected: 
Group C:  n = 573 (- 65 missing data)     
Group B:   n = 626 (- 35 missing data)       
Group A:   n = 642 (- 10 missing data)       
 
3.1. Total price of a consultation  
                                                 
   29
 
3.1.1 Percentage of free consultations 
Freq %   CI to 95 % 
Group C (508) 9      1.6 %   [0.6 ￿ 2.5] 
Group B (591) 33      5.6 %   [2.9 ￿ 8.3] 
Group A (632) 37      5.8 %   [3.1 ￿ 8.6] 
 
Group C includes significantly fewer free consultations than the two other groups. 
 
 
3.1.2 Total price of a consultation when the patient has to pay: 
 
      Group C 
(n = 499)  
Group B 
(n = 558) 
Group A  
(n = 595) 
Total 
price 
Average price 
Median price 
Range 
2.254 [1.163 ￿ 3.346]
1.100 
100 ￿ 60.000 
1267 [1031￿1504] 
800 
100 ￿ 20.000 
472 [320 ￿ 625] 
300 
20 ￿ 20.000 
   (448) (510)  (567) 
Price 
without 
an over-
night stay 
Average price 
Median price 
Range 
1.421 [1176 ￿ 1665] 
1.000 
100 ￿ 14.200 
987 [856 - 1117]  
750 
100 ￿ 13.000 
402 [295 - 509] 
300 
20 ￿ 9.100 
   (51)  (48)  (28) 
Price with 
an over-
night stay 
Average price 
Median price 
Range 
9.578 [2.996 ￿ 16.161]
6.000 
1000 ￿ 60.000 
4.250 [2.701 ￿ 5.799]
3.500 
600 ￿ 20.000 
1.906 [388 ￿ 3.425]
500 
100 ￿ 20.000 
 
The average prices in Groups B and C correspond to more than double or four times 
the average price in Group A, the difference being statistically significant and the 
median prices in Groups B and C corresponding to more than double or triple the 
median price in group A. 
 
Without including an overnight stay in the HC, we note that a straightforward 
consultation will cost, on average, more than twice in Group B than in A, and more 
than three times in C than in A, the difference between the three groups being 
statistically significant. The increase in the median price between the groups is   
roughly the same proportion as for the average price. 
 
However, once an overnight stay in the HC is included, the gap widens 
considerably. Given the weakness of the sample, the average prices are not 
statistically different, although they are twice and five times higher in Groups B and 
C compared with A. On the other hand, compared with Group A, the median price 
in Group B is seven times higher and in Group C, twelve times higher. 
 
3.2 Price of laboratory tests in the health centres  
 
Many people do not know in detail how the cost of a consultation breaks down 
(especially in Groups B and C); there is a great deal of missing data regarding the 
cost of tests: 
Group C: 209 tests performed ￿ 116 missing data= 93. 
Group B: 335 tests performed ￿ 180 missing data= 155. 
Group A: 168 tests performed ￿ 30 missing data= 138.   30
 
3.2.1 Percentage of free tests (or included in the flat fee)*:   
 
Freq      %    CI to 95 % 
Group C (93)     5      5.4 %   [1.3 ￿ 9.4] 
Group B (155) 14                9.0 %   [2.9 ￿ 15.2] 
Group A (138) 94      68.1 %   [54.7- 81.5] 
* After excluding the "I don’t knows".  
 
In group A, of 138 tests prescribed, 44 patients (31.9%) had to pay for the 
laboratory tests although the health centres theoretically offer a flat fee consultation 
with tests and medicines included.  
 
3.2.2 Price of tests when the patient has to pay  
      Group C 
(n = 88) 
Group B 
(n = 141) 
Group A  
(n = 44) 
Price of the 
lab test 
Average 
price 
 
Median price 
Range 
405 [258 ￿ 553] 
300 
100 ￿ 3.000 
261 [210 ￿ 313] 
200 
50 ￿ 1000 
223 [159 ￿ 286] 
200 
50 ￿ 1.400 
   n=61  n=130 n=39 
Price 
without 
overnight 
stay 
Average 
price 
 [95%CI] 
315 [259 ￿ 371]  259 [206 ￿ 312]  211 [141 ￿ 282] 
   n=27  n=11  n=5 
Price with 
overnight 
stay 
Average 
price 
[95%CI] 
610 [211 ￿ 1009]  286 [155 ￿ 417]  310 [186 - 434] 
 
We can observe an increase in the cost moving from A to C, although the weakness 
of the sample does not enable us to prove this difference statistically.  
 
Without an overnight stay, we note a slight increase from A to C, although it is not 
significant. In addition, we observe that, in Group C, more tests are performed when 
there are one or more overnight stays (A: 5/29 = 1/6, B: 11/49 = 1/4, C: 27/51 = 
1/2).  
 
3.3. Price of treatments in the health centres  
 
Many people do not know exactly how the cost of the consultation breaks down 
(especially in Groups B and C). There is a great deal of missing data regarding the 
cost of treatments: 
Group C: 539 treatments received in the HC ￿ 432 missing data= 107. 
Group B: 571 treatments received in the HC ￿ 453 missing data= 118. 
Group A: 594 treatments received in the HC ￿ 202 missing data= 392. 
 
3.3.1 Percentage of free treatments (or included in the flat fee)*  
 
   Freq       %   CI  to  95  % 
Group C (107)   10      9.3 %   [3.4 ￿ 15.3]   31
Group B (118)   30    25.4 %   [11.3 ￿ 39.5] 
Group A (392)   364    92.9 %   [89.3 ￿ 96.4] 
* After excluding the "I don’t knows". 
 
Out of 392 patients, 28, or 7.1 %, had to pay for treatment in Group A, although this 
is theoretically included in the flat fee price. This proportion is nevertheless 
markedly lower than for tests.  
 
 
3.3.2 Price of treatments in the health centres when the patient has to pay  
      Group C 
(n = 28) 
Group B 
(n = 85) 
Group A  
(n = 95) 
Price of the 
medicines 
Average 
price 
Median price 
Range 
2.000 [1166 ￿ 2835] 
1.000 
120 ￿ 13.780 
853 [574 ￿ 1131]   
600 
50 ￿ 10.000 
750 [270 ￿ 1230]  
300 
50 ￿ 5.000 
      (n=27)  (n=83) (n=87) 
Price without 
a overnight 
stay 
Average 
price 
[95%CI] 
1.624 [986 ￿ 2.261] 840 [557 - 1122]  763 [266 - 1260]
     (n=8)  (n=2) (n=1) 
Price with a 
overnight 
stay 
Average 
price 
[95%CI] 
6.100 [4345 ￿ 7855] 1.400  400 
 
The average price in Group C is 2.5 times higher than in Group A and 2.3 higher 
than in Group B. As the sample in A is very limited, the statistical significance of 
this difference only applies between B and C. The median prices in Groups B and C 
correspond to double or almost triple the median price in Group A. 
 
As with the tests, we can observe that the fact of being hospitalised in the HC 
practically quadruples the price of treatment in Group C. 
 
3.4. Cost of an episode of malaria or fever among patients paying for their care  
 
In the three groups, we find the same proportion of patients consulting with 
suspicion of malaria or fever:  
C: 330 / 499 = 66.1 % 
B: 362 / 558 = 64.9 % 
A: 368 / 595 = 61.8 % 
 
3.4.1 Global price of a consultation for fever or malaria 
 
   Group  C 
(n = 330) 
Group B 
(n = 362) 
Group A 
(n = 368) 
Total price 
for malaria 
Average 
price 
Median price 
Range 
2.238 [1045 ￿ 3430]
1.000 
100 ￿ 60.000 
1.301 [968 ￿ 1635]  
800 
100 ￿ 20.000 
458 [339 ￿ 577] 
300 
50 ￿ 9.100 
   (n=65)  (n=104)  (n=30) 
Price of the  Average  342.7 [244.6 ￿ 440.8] 259 [202 ￿ 316]  180 [147 ￿ 213]      32
lab test  price 
Median price 
Range 
300 
100 - 800 
200 
100 ￿ 1.000 
175 
50 ￿ 500 
   (n=56)  (n=49) (n=15) 
Price of the 
treatment 
Average 
price 
Median price 
Range 
1.790 [997 ￿ 2582] 
1.000 
120 ￿ 9.500 
918 [466 ￿ 1370]   
600 
50 ￿ 10.000 
963 [55 ￿ 1872] 
300 
150 ￿ 5.000 
 
We observe an increase in the average price moving from Groups A to C, although 
the weakness of the sample does not allow us to prove this distance statistically. The 
median price is double and triple in B and C compared with A. We can also see that 
in Groups A, B and C, respectively 4.1%, 13.5% and 17% of patients paid for the 
treatment, although it is theoretically included in the flat fee for malaria. 
 
3.4.2 Global price of a consultation for fever or malaria according to overnight 
stays  
 
      Group C 
(n = 330) 
Group B 
(n = 362) 
Group A 
(n = 368) 
Total price 
for malaria 
Average 
price 
Median price 
Range 
2238 [1045 ￿ 3430] 
1.000 
100 ￿ 60.000 
1301 [968 ￿ 1635]    
800 
100 ￿ 20.000 
458 [339 ￿ 577] 
300 
50 ￿ 9.100 
      (n=293)  (n=326) (n=352) 
Price 
without a 
overnight 
stay 
Average 
price 
Median price 
Range 
1.303 [1053 - 1554]   
1.000 
100 ￿ 14.200 
977 [802 - 1552]    
750 
100 ￿ 13.000 
409 [287 ￿ 530]  
300 
50 ￿ 9.100 
     (n=37)  (n=36) (n=16) 
Price with a 
overnight 
stay 
Average 
price 
Median price 
Range 
9.636 [2835 - 16437] 
6.000 
1.100 ￿ 60.000 
4.241 [2254 - 6228]  
3.350 
700 ￿ 20.000 
1.549 [814 ￿ 2283] 
1.050 
250 ￿ 5.000 
 
A. Total price of a consultation for fever or malaria without overnight stay 
We note that the cost of a straightforward consultation for malaria is, on average, 
two times higher in B than in A, and more than three times higher in C than in A, 
the difference between the three groups being statistically significant. The increase 
in the median price between the groups is similar.  
 
B. Total price of a consultation for fever or malaria with overnight stays 
We observe an increase in the cost moving from Groups A to C, although the 
weakness of the sample does not allow us to prove this difference statistically. The 
median price is triple and more than quintuple that in B and C compared with A. 
 
3.4.3 Average price of treatment for malaria according to overnight stays   
 
Price of 
treatment 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
   (n=51)  (n=48)  (n=14)   33
Price without a 
overnight stay 
Average price 
 [95% CI] 
1.469  
[829 - 2109] 
921  
[459 - 1383] 
1.004  
[33 - 974] 
   (n=5)  (n=1)  (n=1) 
Price with a 
overnight stay 
Average price  
[95% CI] 
5.060  
[2.980 ￿ 7.140] 
800 400 
 
We see for malaria treatment a similar increase in cost as for the lab tests; the price 
increases  strongly from group A to group C although the weakness of the sample 
does not allow us to prove this difference statistically. 
 
3.6. Additional costs 
 
The additional costs represent mainly indirect costs related to a consultation. 
 
Proportion of patients who had additional costs: 
Group C:    97 / 571 = 17.0% [11.6 ￿ 22.3]  
Group B:  129 / 623 = 20.7% [13.4 ￿ 28.1]  
Group A:  108 / 642 = 16.8%  [11.3 ￿ 22.3]  
 
 
  Group C**  Group B*  Group A 
Type of cost  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Transport  85  89.5  [82.8 ￿ 96.1] 94  76.4  [56.7 ￿ 96.2] 89  82.4  [73.4 ￿ 91.4] 
Food  6  6.3  [0.8 ￿ 11.8] 19  15.4  [0.0 ￿ 32.3] 4  3.7  [0.1 ￿ 7.3] 
Registration 
sheet or card 
1  1.1  [0.0 ￿ 3.1]  9  7.3  [0.0 ￿ 19.4] 6  5.6  [0.2 ￿ 11] 
Transport and 
food 
3  3.2  [0.0 ￿ 6.5]  1  0.8  [0.0 ￿ 5.0]  9  8.3  [2.5 ￿ 14.1] 
TOTAL  95  100   123 100  108  100   
 * 6 missing data 
** 2 missing data 
 
For the three groups, the additional costs are mainly related to transport.  
 
Costs of transport (transport alone, or in combination with food costs):  
Group C:  88 / 95   = 92.6%  [87.0 ￿ 98.3]  
Group B:  95 / 123 = 77.2%  [57.7 ￿ 96.7]  
Group A:  98 / 108 = 90.7%  [83.9 ￿ 97.6]   34
  
 
3.5. Origin of the money spent on health care 
 
We asked the patients if they had paid for their care in cash or if they had used 
another solution to pay for health care, such as selling land, livestock, the current or 
future harvest, working elsewhere, borrowing from a third party, incurring a debt, 
etc.  
 
People able to assume the cost of care by taking from their savings  
Group C:   82 / 499 = 16.4% [11.5 ￿ 21.2] 
Group B:   141 / 558 = 25.3% [18.5 ￿ 32.1] 
Group A:   247 / 595 = 41.5% [32.5 ￿50.5] (significantly more than the two 
other groups) 
 
In Group A, two out of five people could pay for a consultation out of their savings, 
as opposed to one in four in Group B and fewer than one in six in Group C. 
Conversely, in Group C, the fact of having a sick person in the family leads to 
impoverishment in 83.6% of families (through falling into debt, selling off whatever 
the family produces or realising some capital, etc.). In Group B, 74.5% of families 
become impoverished and in Group A, 59.5%. 
 
4. Exemption system 
 
In Group A, the proportion of patients with the right to a reduction in health care 
costs is 130/902 = 14.4 % [9.6 ￿ 19.2]. In Group B, the proportion of patients with 
the right to a reduction in health care costs is 67/923 = 7.3 % [4.2 ￿ 10.3]. In Group 
C, the proportion of patients with the right to a reduction in health care costs is 
80/941 = 8.5 % [4.5 ￿ 12.5] 
 
 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Type of 
reduction 
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
CAM card  62  77.5 [65.1 ￿ 89.9] 35  52.2 [29.5-75.0]  70  53.8  [40.3 ￿ 67.4] 
MFP (civil 
servants 
insurance) 
9  11.2  [2.7 ￿ 19.8] 12  17.9 [6.6-29.2]  35  26.9 [11.0 ￿ 42.8] 
’Indigence  card’  6  7.5  [0.2 ￿ 14.8] 6  9.0  [0.4-17.6]  18  13.8  [6.5 ￿ 21.2] 
Soldiers and 
their families 
      1  1.5  [0.0 ￿ 4.0]  1  0.8  [0.0 ￿ 2.3] 
Other  3  3.7  [0.0 ￿ 8.5]  13  19.4 [0.0 ￿ 39.9] 6  4.6  [0.0 ￿ 10.0] 
TOTAL 
reductions 
80 100    67 100   130 100   
 * Other = repatriated by the UNHCR, parish certificate, health personnel, etc.  
 
In Group C, 0.06% of patients were in possession of a ’poverty card’. In Group B, 
1.3% of patients have the right to free care because they are destitute. In Group A, 
there were a few more people holding an ’indigence card’ (2%).   35
IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
1. Vulnerability 
 
We categorized seven types of vulnerability according to the following criteria:  
 
Criterion 1 =   factors linked to the family situation (female-headed household, with 
or without dependent children; child-headed household with no 
outside assistance; elderly person, isolated or with dependent 
children; handicapped person dependent on the family or a 
chronically sick person dependent on the family); 
Criterion 2 =   land-related  factors  (without land or without access to the land 
owned) 
Criterion 3 =   factors linked to displacement (displaced or repatriated); 
Criterion 4 =   family and land; 
Criterion 5 =   family and displacement; 
Criterion 6 =   land and displacement; 
Criterion 7 =   family, land and displacement. 
 
The proportion of patients meeting at least one of the criteria for vulnerability is 
44.5 % [CI 37.0-52.1] for Group A (402 patients out of 903), 73.2 % [62.3-84.1] for 
Group B (676 patients out of 924) and 48.9 % [41.9-55.8] for Group C (460 patients 
out of 941).  
Groups A and C are more or less similar, while Group B contains significantly more 
patients meeting at least one of the criteria for vulnerability than Groups A and C: 
this is due to the special and geographically limited situation of this group, which is 
only within the province of Makamba where there are many sites with displaced 
people, while the two other groups are distributed over several provinces.  
 
2. Weekly expenditure and income 
 
Weekly expenditure based on all the data available   
Group C          931 / 941 =  10 missing data 
Group B          896 / 924 =  34 missing data 
Group A          840 / 903 =  63 missing data   
 
Expenditure    Group C (931)  Group B (896)    Group A (840)  
Average  2516 [2010 ￿ 3022]  3071 [2618 ￿ 3524]  3062 [1922 ￿ 4202] 
Median  1500  2000    1000   
Range  20 ￿ 30000  100 ￿ 30000    50 ￿50000    
 
The difference in expenditure between the groups is not significant. If we establish a 
national average by putting the three groups together, the average monthly 
expenditure would be 12.078 Fbu per family or 2.157 Fbu per person. 
 
If we look at the average expenditure among patients consulting, among those 
consulting at the HC selected and among those consulting at the HC selected and 
paying for the consultation, we find similar values. 
 
Weekly expenditure per group 
 
  Group C   Group B     Group  A
                 36
<1000 BIF  270=29% [23.1-34.9]  186=20.8% [14.3-27.2] 327=38.9%  
                 [ 3 0 . 4 -
47.4] 
 
1000-1999 BIF  245=26.3% [22.3-30.3]   197=22.0% [17-4-26.6] 
 207=24.6%   
           [ 2 0 . 3 -
29.0]   
  
2000-4649 BIF  269=28.9% [24.9-32.9]   289=32.3% [27.8-36.8] 
 147=17.5%   
           [ 1 3 . 9 -
21.1] 
  
4650 BIF and +  147=15.8% [10.7-20.9]   224=25.0% [18.3-31.7] 
 159=18.9%   
           [ 1 0 . 1 -
27.8]  
 
The number of families in the category ￿ less then 1000 Fbu￿ is statistically different 
between the 3 groups (p<0.05). 
        
Weekly income based on all the data available  
Group C          912 / 941 = 29 missing data 
Group B          888 / 924 = 36 missing data 
Group A          818 / 903 = 85 missing data   
 
   Group C (912)    Group B (888)              Group A (818) 
  
Average income  2.625 [2.118 ￿ 3.132] 3.342  [2.871 ￿ 3.813]  3.413  [2229 ￿ 
4599] 
Median income  1.500          2.100      1.250              
  
Range    20  ￿  50.000     100  ￿  45.000   50  ￿  60.000 
     
If we look at the average income among people consulting, these are similar for any 
health centre consulted (the nearest one or another). 
 
 
 
Percentage of families below the poverty threshold* (based on the data available) 
 
                    freq          %             CI to 95% 
 Group C          696 / 843     82.6%            [79.0-94.7] 
 Group B          701 / 767     91.4%            [88.4-94.4] 
 Group A          649 / 721      90.0%            [87.2-92.8] 
 
* The relative poverty threshold for Burundi according to the preparatory text for the ’Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper’ prepared by the Burundian government with the aid of the IMF is  53.650 
Fbu/per/yr, or 1031.73 Fbu/per/wk, or less than 1 USD per week.   37
V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND ACCESS TO CARE 
 
1. Total price of consultation / median income 
 
Below we compare weekly incomes (calculated for the health centres; not including 
free consultations; overnight stays included).  
 
The consultation price /income ratio was obtained by calculating for each family the 
proportion that represents health-care expenditure compared with the household’s 
weekly income. The results presented below are the averages and median ratios, 
expressed as percentage.  
 
The price of a consultation compared with weekly income expressed as an 
overall percentage 
 
    C (n = 490)      B (n = 549)    A (n = 545)  
% average  173.8% [122.1 – 225.6] 93.7% [66.3 – 121]  52.2% [33.4 – 71.1] 
% median  73.3%              31.3%      20.0%   
Range   0.8  ￿  3800%    0-5000%   0.3  ￿2000%   
 
In the flat fee group (Group A), the average price of a consultation represents 
around half the average income of a whole family. This expenditure amounts to 
almost one week of income in Group B, and 1￿ weeks in Group C. The increase 
from A to C is significant (p<0.05). 
 
It is well known that extreme values draw the average upwards. Therefore, the 
median is often preferred, as it is unaffected by these extreme values. The median 
price for a consultation represents 1/5 of the weekly income in Group A, around 1/3 
in Group B and about ￿ in Group C. Although the median values in itself are 
inferior to the average, the ratio between the groups remains the same.  
 
The price of a overnight stay (higher than a normal consultation) influences this 
global proportion, as indicated in the following results. 
 
Proportion of weekly income spent on a consultation, according to overnight stay 
  Group C  Group B      Group A 
  N   %  N      %      N      % 
Without  15   313 [241 - 386]       501   81.7 [52.9-110.5]  522     43.5 [30.1 
￿ 56.9] 
With     5     1.460 [0 - 3044]       48      219.6 [111.7-327.5]  23     250.1 
[25.3 ￿ 475]   
Roughly speaking, without overnight stay overnight stay, the ratio between the 
groups remains the same. With overnight stays, the weakness of the sample does not 
permit a statistical demonstration of the difference. 
 
Comparison on the basis of a family's daily income 
Group C: 1 consultation = +/- 12 days of income 
Group B: 1 consultation = +/- 6.5 days of income  
Group A: 1 consultation = +/- 3.5 days of income 
 
The same calculation, based on the median values: 
Group C: 1 consultation = +/- 5 days of income 
Group B: 1 consultation = +/- 2 days of income    38
Group A: 1 consultation = +/- 1.5 days of income 
 
Roughly speaking, the ratio between the groups remains similar. 
 
 
2. Vulnerability and access to care 
 
2.1 Relationship between vulnerability and consultations (calculated on all sick 
people presenting at least one criterion of vulnerability) 
 
% of vulnerable people who did not consult  
   F r e q    %    9 5 %   C I  
Group C     99 / 460  21.5%   [17.2- 25.8] 
Group B     80 / 676  11.8%   [8.5 ￿ 15.1] 
Group A     48 / 402  11.9%   [7.8 ￿ 16.1] 
 
The percentage of vulnerable people who did not consult is significantly higher in 
Group C than in the two other groups (p<0.05). Compared with the total population, 
the percentages for those not consulting are slightly higher among vulnerable people 
(9.3 and 11.9% for Group A, 9.6 and 11.8% for group B, 17.4 and 21.5% for Group 
C). 
 
Among vulnerable people not consulting, % claiming lack of money as the 
reason 
   F r e q    %    9 5   %   C I  
Group C     89 / 99   89.2 %   [82.5 ￿ 97.3] 
Group B     64 / 80   80.0 %   [71.8 ￿ 88.2] 
Group A     38 / 48   79.2 %   [61.3 ￿ 97] 
 
We note no statistical difference between the three groups because the total number 
included is too small. 
 
 
2.2. Relationship between vulnerability and reduction cards (calculated on all 
vulnerable sick people) 
 
% vulnerable people holding a reduction card  
   Freq   %   95  %  CI 
Group C     33 / 460  7.2%    [4.1 ￿ 10.3] 
Group B     49 / 676  7.3%    [3.9 ￿ 10.6] 
Group A     63 / 402  15.8%   [10.6 ￿ 20.8] 
 
In these three groups, we could observe that the percentage of vulnerable people 
holding a reduction card is not very high. In Group A, this percentage is, however, 
double (statistically significant). This percentage is comparable to that of the overall 
sample. This means that the vulnerable have no more chance of obtaining a 
reduction card than the general population. 
 
2.3 Percentage of the population below the poverty threshold attending a 
consultation when sick 
 
                    Freq          %             CI to 95 % 
Group C          696 /843  82.6 %            [79.0 ￿ 86.2]    39
Group B          701 / 767     91.4 %            [88.4 ￿ 94.4] 
Group A          649 / 721      90.0 %            [87.2 ￿ 92.8] 
 
We notice that in Group C, those living below the poverty threshold consult 
significantly less than in the two other groups.   40
 
PART FOUR: 
 
RESULTS OF THE USER SURVEYS AT THE EXIT OF THE HEALTH 
CENTRES AND THE SURVEYS OF PATIENT CARDS AT THE HEALTH 
CENTRES 
 
 
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
PATIENTS  
 
1. Patients questioned 
 
Within Group A, 458 patients or other persons accompanying a patient were 
questioned at the exit of the health centre. Within Group B, 469 patients or their 
relations were questioned. Finally, within Group C, 458 patients or persons 
accompanying them were questioned. 
 
2. Morbidity 
 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Severity of the illness  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
 Not very serious  48  10.5  [5.9-15.1]  54  11.6  [5.7-17.4]  59  12.9  [7.9-17.9] 
  Serious  117 25.6 [19.8-31.4] 275 58.9 [51.9-65.8] 297 65.0 [56.9-73.1]
  Very  serious  292 63.9 [55.6-72.1] 138 29.6 [22.1-36.9] 101 22.1 [14.4-29.6]
  
There is a significant difference in how patients regarded their illness between 
Groups A and B and Group C (p<0.05). The proportion of patients in Group C who 
considered themselves to be seriously ill is significantly greater than in Groups A 
and B. In fact, in Group C, 63.9% of patients regarded themselves as seriously ill, 
while in Groups A and B, only 22.1 and 29.6 % of patients considered themselves 
seriously ill. 
 
 
II ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
This is the same question as that posed in the ’household’ survey. We hoped, given 
the difficulty of the question and out of a concern for verification, to double check 
its results in the household survey with the results from the exit user survey. 
 
1. Expenditure 
 
In Group A, the average expenditure per household and per week is 2.557,3 Fbu. 
The range extends from 0 to 35.000 Fbu. In this group, 50 % of the sample spent 
less than 1.200 Fbu per week.  
In Group C, the same expenditure was evaluated at 2.244,9 Fbu and the range 
extends from 0 to 30.000 Fbu. Here, 50% of the sample is lower than 1.200 Fbu.  
 
2. Income 
 
In Group A, the average income per household and per week is 3.458,1 Fbu and the 
range extends from 0 to 70.000 Fbu. Here, 50 % of the sample is lower than or 
equal to 1.500 Fbu.    41
The income of the households in Group C is evaluated at 2.524,3 Fbu.  
 
These results are similar to those of the household survey. 
 
 
 
III. QUALITY OF THE DIAGNOSIS AND THE CARE PROVIDED  
 
1. Indicators of quality observed or reported  
 
As regards the quality of the diagnosis and the care provided in the HC, we utilised 
’proxy’ indicators, which are quite easy to observe and to measure. Here is a 
summary of the principal results.  
 
Temperature-taking 
 
Temperature-taking in general 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Temperature 
taken 
Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
Patients overall  140  30.6  [19.3-41.9]  112  23.9  [11.5-36.3]  180  39.3  [26.5-52.1] 
 Children < 5 
years 
30 33.0  [16.4-49.5]  30  26.8  [11.5-42.1]  43  49.4  [32.1-66.7] 
 Patients 
complaining of 
fever 
76/211  36.0  [21.4 ￿ 50.7] 64 / 233 27.5  [13.6 ￿ 41.3]  101 / 218  46.3  [30.5 ￿ 62.2]
  
The proportion of patients whose temperature was taken is slightly higher in Group 
A than in Groups B and C, but this difference is not statistically significant.  
 
Performing a clinical examination 
 
For all patients together: 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Clinical 
examination 
Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI 
  Performed  48 10.5  [5.9-15.1] 42 9.0 [5.4-12.5] 48 10.5  [5.3-15.7] 
 Not performed  117  25.6  [19.8-31.4] 185 39.4 [31.4-47.5] 219 47.9  [38.9-57.0] 
 Not applicable   292  63.9  [55.6-72.1] 242 51.6 [43.9-59.3] 190 41.6  [33.7-49.4] 
  TOTAL  457  100  469 100  457 100  
  
We notice that only one patient in ten, no matter the group, was given a clinical 
examination. This tendency is met again in children under five years. 
 
Vaccination card controls 
 
In the three Groups A, B and C, among children < 5 years, the consultant asked to 
see the vaccination card in only two cases (2.3%, CI [0.0-5.7] for A; 0.4%, CI 
[0.01.3] for B and 2.2%, CI [0.0-5.1] for C). These very low figures indicate how 
frequent  opportunities are lost to refer a child from the curative consultation 
towards vaccination.  
 
Diagnosis given to the patient 
   42
Few consultants took the trouble to give the diagnosis to the patient.  
 
Knowledge of the diagnosis    Freq     %      95%CI 
Group C      155 / 458  33.8 %   [25.8 ￿ 41.8] 
Group B      191 / 469  40.7 %   [33.5 ￿ 48.0] 
Group A      115 / 458  25.1 %   [18.8 ￿ 31.4] 
 
The patients in Group B were slightly more aware of the diagnosis that those in 
Group A.  
 
Length of the consultation  
 
The length of the consultation was calculated by an interviewer from the moment 
when the patient sat down in front of the consultant to the moment s/he left. 
   Average   Median  +  frequent 
 Range 
Group C (n = 30)  6 min 48 sec    6 min    5 min      3 
- 15 
Group B (n = 17)  6 min 48 sec    7 min    7 min      5- 
10 
Group  A  (n  =  24)  6  min    5  min   5  min    3 
- 10 
Total for the HC  6 min 30 sec    6 min    5 min      3 
– 15 
 
The length of a consultation is comparable in the three groups and varies from 5 to 7 
minutes per patient.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
In a large majority of cases, the environment in which the consultation takes place 
makes it possible to maintain confidentiality (verified at each centre by the 
interviewer):  
   Freq   %   CI  to  95% 
Group C    25 / 29   86.2%   [73.4 ￿ 99.0] 
Group B    15 / 17   88.2%   [72.4 ￿ 100] 
Group A    18 / 24   75%    [57.3 ￿ 92.7] 
Total for the HC  59 / 71   83.1%   [74.6 ￿ 91.6] 
 
There are no statistically significant differences between the three groups. 
 
Waiting time 
 
In Group A, the average waiting time is 1 hr 24 min, varying from 0 to 6 hr; 55.6% 
of patients waited a maximum of 1 hr (n = 258), but 18.4% had a very long waiting 
time of up to or beyond 3 hr. In Group B, the waiting time average is 1 hr 30 min, 
varying from 0 to 5 hr; 49.8% of patients waited a maximum of 1 hr, but 21.8 % had 
a very long waiting time of 3 hr or beyond. In Group C, the average waiting time is 
1 hr 42 min, varying from 0 to 9 hr 10 min; 50.8% of patients waited a maximum of 
1 hr (n = 232), but 24.3% had a very long waiting time of 3 hr or beyond.  
 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Waiting time  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI  Fr.  %  95% CI 
<10 minutes  27  5.9  [3.1 ￿ 8.7]  51  10.9  [6.3-15.5]  72  15.8  [9.5-22.1]   43
15 minutes  59  12.9  [8.7 ￿ 17.2]  45  9.6  [5.4-13.8]  41  9.0  [5.2-12.8] 
30 minutes  51  11.1  [7.7 ￿ 14.6]  60  12.8  [9.2-16.5]  45  9.9  [7.0-12.8] 
45 minutes  29  6.3  [3.6 ￿ 9.1]  12  2.6  [1.1-4.0]  16  3.5  [1.7-5.3] 
1 hour  68  14.9  [10.9 ￿ 18.9]  68  14.5  [10.6-18.4]  84  18.4  [13.9-22.9] 
1 hour 30  34  7.4  [4.6 ￿ 10.3]  46  9.8  [6.1-13.5]  30  6.6  [3.7-9.4] 
2 hours  62  13.6  [9.2 ￿ 17.9]  60  12.8  [8.8-16.9]  64  14.0  [9.9-18.2] 
2 hours 30  16  3.5  [1.7 ￿ 5.3]  22  4.7  [1.8-7.6]  20  4.4  [2.7-6.1] 
3 hours and more  111  24.3  [14.7 ￿ 33.9]  104  21.8  [15.5-28.9]  84  18.4  [11.1-25.7] 
TOTAL 457  100   468  100   456  100   
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The indicators for the quality of care are summarised in the following table:  
   Result (good/average/poor) 
Indicator  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Temperature-taking  Poor Poor  Poor 
Clinical examination  Poor Poor  Poor 
Confidentiality potential  Good Good  Good 
Patient's knowledge of the diagnosis  Average Average  Average 
Length of a consultation  Average Average  Average 
Waiting time  Poor Poor  Poor 
 
 
2. Utilisation of the HC and patient satisfaction 
 
Decision to return to this health centre 
In answer to the question "Will you return to this health centre if you, or someone in 
your family, is ill?", between 94.3 and 98.1% of patients replied in the affirmative. 
The differences between the groups are not statistically significant.   
 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Return and reason  Fr.  %  95% CI Fr.  % 95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI 
 Yes  432  94.3  [91.6-
97.1] 
460 98.1 [96.6-
99.6] 
437  95.4  [93.3-
97.5] 
 Satisfied with the 
care provided 
157 34.3 [28.1-
40.5] 
207 45.1 [37.7-
52.5] 
195 44.6 [37.1-
52.1] 
  
The principal reason given in the three groups for agreeing to return to the same 
centre is satisfaction with the care provided. There is no significant difference 
between the groups. There is a striking difference with the  result of the 
’objectivised’ indicators above.  
 
The other reasons evoked were: "satisfaction with the reception", "served rapidly", 
"not too expensive", "I don’t know another HC" and "it’s the nearest HC". 
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IV. ACCES TO CARE AND VULNERABILITY 
 
1. Reductions 
 
1.1 Holders of a reduction card 
In Group A, 10.7 % (49 / 458) [7.2 ￿ 14.2] of patients have the right to a reduction 
or an exemption. In group B, 15.8% (74/469) [11.3-20.8] have the right to a 
reduction or to free care. Finally in Group C, 12.2 % (56 / 458) [4.7 ￿ 19.7] of 
patients have the right to a reduction or to free care. The differences between the 
groups are not significant. 
 
1.2 Type of reduction card 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
  Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI Fr. %  95%  CI 
CAM   29  52.7  [32.7 ￿ 
72.8] 
5 6.9 [0-14.8] 5  10.2  [0.0-22.0] 
Indigence card 
(Certificate 
proving poverty) 
4  7.3  [0.0 ￿ 15.8] 34  46.6  [29.0-64.2] 27  55.1  [32.6- 77.6]
Certificate 
proving 
displacement, 
repatriation, 
victim of 
disaster 
2  3.6  [0.0 ￿ 8.9]  17  23.3  [11.6- 35.0] 6  12.2  [0.4-24.1] 
Insurance 
(mutuelle) for 
civil servants 
13 23.6  [10.1  ￿ 
37.1] 
9 12.3  [3.7-21.0] 5 10.2  [1.8-18.6] 
Military and 
family 
1  1.8  [0.0 ￿ 5.3] 
 
2 2.7 [0.0-6.3] 
 
2 4.1  [0.0-11.7] 
 
Health 
personnel 
3 5.5  [0.0  ￿  16.0] 2 2.7 [0.0-6.3] 1 2.0 [0.0-6.1] 
Other  3 5.5  [0.0  ￿  12.5] 4 5.5  [0.0-11.9]  3 6.1  [0.0-17.7] 
TOTAL    100     100  49  100  
  
In Group C, the number of patients holding a ’indigence card’ (7.3%) at the exit of a 
health centre is markedly lower in Groups A and B (55.1 and 46.6). This difference 
is significant. 
 
2. Payment difficulties 
 
1.1 Presence of a difficulty to pay 
 
In Group A, 138/457 people, or 30.2 % [21.1 ￿ 39.2] experienced difficulties in 
paying for health care. In Group B, 194/469, or 41% [32.5-50.2] experienced 
payment difficulties. Finally, in Group C, the figure is comparable: 192 / 458 
people, or 41.9 % [33.6 ￿ 50.3] experienced difficulties in paying for health care. 
 
1.2 Reasons for the difficulty  
 
  Group C  Group B  Group A 
Reasons Fr. %  95%  CI  Fr. % 95%  CI  Fr.  % 95%  CI   46
1. Not earning 
enough  
106 55.8 [46.9  ￿ 
64.7] 
88 45.6  [36.7  ￿ 
54.5] 
75 54.7  [45.4  ￿ 
64.1] 
2. Previous 
expenses for this 
illness  
27  14.2  [8.0 ￿ 20.4] 18  9.3  [4.7 ￿ 13.9] 21  15.3  [9.7 ￿ 21.0]
3. Too many 
expenses in 
other domains* 
11  5.8  [2.1 ￿ 9.5]  18  9.3  [5.0 ￿ 13.6] 11  8.0  [3.4 ￿ 12.6]
4. Price of the 
care is too high 
17  8.9  [2.5 ￿ 15.4] 4  2.1  [0.2 ￿ 3.9]  6  4.4  [1.0 ￿ 7.8] 
5. Several 
illnesses 
22  1.1  [3.5 ￿ 19.6] 6  3.1  [0.0 ￿ 6.4]  2  1.5  [0.0 ￿ 3.3] 
6. Temporary 
cash flow 
problem 
2  3.6  [0.0 ￿ 2.5]  25  13.0  [6.2 ￿ 19.7] 5  3.6  [0.8 ￿ 6.5] 
7. Other  5  2.6  [0.0 ￿ 5.2]  34  17.6  [9.3 ￿ 25.9] 16  11.7  [7.1 ￿ 16.2]
1 + 3  190     0      1  0.7  [0.0 ￿ 2.2] 
TOTAL    100   193 100   137  100  
 * E.g. school fees, seed purchases, etc. 
 
1.3 Potential solution envisaged 
   Group C  Group B  Group A 
Solutions Fr. %  95%  CI  Fr. % 95%  CI  Fr.  % 95%  CI 
1. None  11  5.7  [1.6 ￿ 9.8]  9  4.7  [1.5 ￿ 7.8]  21  15.4  [8.2-22.7] 
2. Loan from 
family or 
neighbours 
60 31.2  [23.2  ￿ 
39.3] 
 
82 42.5  29.5  ￿ 
55.4] 
23 16.9  [10.6-23.2]
3. Debt incurred 
at the HC 
21  10.9  [3.4 ￿ 18.5] 9  4.7  [1.4 ￿ 7.9]  13  9.6  [0.0-19.4] 
4. Work in the 
fields 
18  9.4  [4.1 ￿ 14.6]
 
32 16.6  [8.4  ￿  24.8] 17 12.5 [6.1-18.9] 
5. Work 
elsewhere 
19 10.0 [5.4  ￿  14.4] 22 11.4 [5.4  ￿  17.4] 32  23.5 [14.3-32.7]
6. Reduce other 
expenses 
2  1.0  [0.0 ￿ 2.5]  4  2.1  [0.0 ￿ 4.4]  0     
7.Sell 
vegetables, fruit, 
etc. 
43 5.2  [15.5  ￿ 
29.2] 
 
26  13.5  [7.5 ￿ 19.5] 20  14.7  [9.4 ￿ 20.0]
8. Sell livestock  5  0.7  [0.1 ￿ 5.1]  0  0    2  1.5  [0.0 ￿ 3.4] 
9. Sell a piece of 
land 
2  0.5  [0.1 ￿ 2.5]  1  0.5  [0.0 ￿ 1.5]       
10. Sell 
something else 
10    [1.0 ￿ 9.5]  0  0    7  5.1  [1.0 ￿ 9.3] 
11. Other  1    [0.0 ￿ 2.1]  4  2.1  [0.2 ￿ 4.0]  1  0.7  [0.0 ￿ 2.1] 
12. 2 + 4        0  0    1    [0.0 ￿ 1.5] 
  TOTAL    100   193 100   192  100  
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 VI. HEALTH CENTRE ATTENDANCE  
 
Analysing the number of curative consultations for 2002 and 2003 reported by the 
health centres surveyed applying cost recovery at 100 % or more we notice a 
reduction of 10% in attendance rates. This corresponds to a reduction of 0.49 to 
0.44 of the curative care coverage, expressed by the number of consultations per 
inhabitant and per year. 
6  
 
Although this could be interpreted as a limited reduction, it must not be forgotten 
that this represents over 29.000 consultations less over the year for the health 
centres (HC) visited alone. Extrapolating from this representative sample towards 
the population covered by HC with cost recovery of 100% or more, we can estimate 
the yearly loss of curative coverage at more than 243.000 consultations for the 
country. 
 
These figures are even more worrying as this reduction is occurring against a 
background of a relatively low curative cover. For rural zones in Africa, the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) often takes a coverage of 0.6 new cases per inhabitant 
and per year as a reference. 
 
More detailed analysis shows us that it is mainly the attendance at public health 
centres that is falling considerably. We observe a reduction in coverage from0.57 in 
2002 to 0.47 in 2003, which is a reduction of 0.09 cons/inhab/yr (17%). 
 
Conversely, the attendance at private (religious)health centres in which there is little 
or no change in the tariff system (these have been applying cost recovery for a long 
time) is increasing slightly. It should be noted that the coverage here is very much 
weaker (0.36 cons/inhab/yr).  
 
Cost-recovery system at 
100% or more 
(group C) 
Population 
covered 
Consult. 
2002 
Consult. 
2003 
Cons/ 
inhab/yr 
2002 
Cons/ 
inhab/yr 
2003 
Difference 
cons/ 
inhab/year
Difference 
in n￿ cons.
 private (religious)HC   178.511  4.523  5.333  0,30  0,36  0,05  9.724 
 Public HC  409.726  19.336 16.097 0,57  0,47  -0,09  -38.868 
Total  588.237           
 
The downward tendency in HC with tariffs set at 100% or more
7 is not uniform 
across Burundi during this same period. On the contrary, in the HCs applying the 
flat fee system an increase in curative care coverage is noted. In the province of 
Makamba, where the level of cost recovery is set at 50%, a reduction in attendance 
is also noticed, but the health coverage is well above the average in public HC. 
 
 Consultations 
2002 
Consultations 
2003 
Cons/inhab/an
2002 
Cons/inhab/a
n 
2003 
Difference
                                                 
6 The quality of the registration in the HC does not make it possible to differentiate between new 
cases (NC) and old cases (OC). We prefer to use the indicator of the number of consultations per 
inhabitant per year. We could estimate that the number of NC is about 85% of the total number of 
consultations.  
7 This in spite of the fact that in some HC, the change towards a flat fee only took place towards the 
middle of 2003. For example, in May 2003 in Cankuzo and in September in Ruyigi.   48
 HC charging a flat fee
(Group A) 
20.110 22.808  0.74 0.84  +  0.10 
 HC with tariff set at 
50% (Group B) 
12.412 10.538  0.79 0.65  -  0.12 
   49
 
 
PART FIVE: 
 
RESULTS FROM INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS WITH KEY ACTORS  
 
The health services 
 
The basic package of health activities organised at the level of the health centres 
includes curative consultations and preventive activities: vaccination (Expanded 
Programme of Immunisation/EPI) and antenatal consultations (ANC). Most of the 
primary care is supplied in two types of health centre: the public health centres and 
the private (religious) health centres that are recognised by the ministry of health. 
Most of the health centres have the possibility of beds for hospitalising patients for 
observation or for treatment. The survey made it possible to establish a list of the 
country’s functioning health centres (see annex). 
 
The private (religious) health centres sign an agreement with the Bureau Provincial 
de la SantØ (BPS)
8. They receive material and supplies for preventive activities from 
the BPS. Medicines are supplied at cost price
9from the medicinal depots managed 
by the diocesan offices. This supply system is dependent on the purchasing 
possibilities in Bujumbura (Centrale d￿Achat en Medicines du 
Burundi
10/CAMEBU, ONAPHA
11, Caritas or private depots such as ALCHEM). 
They also receive donations of medicines. The tariffs follow a list of prices 
calculated on the base of 150% of the cost price of the medicines. This price per 
unit might fluctuate for each batch supplied, as purchase prices differ according to 
the possibilities of that moment. A more or less standard price list also exists for 
medical acts. 
 
The public health centres depend on the BPS. Several health centres benefit from 
external support,  of an NGO, or from a project financed by institutional donors 
such as the EDF, the World Bank, etc. Supplies of medicines for the public health 
centres are obtained through different sources:  
•  Purchases from CAMEBU (requisition by the provincial doctor); 
•  Medicines linked to specific support programmes: CURE (World Bank), 
EDF (EU) and UNICEF; 
•  Medicines supplied by NGOs. 
 
During the interviews, the problem of the lack of qualified personnel in several 
provinces was often raised. In the province of Bujumbura Rural, for example, 
several actors spoke about the practise of ’sharing’ a nurse between several health 
centres, in order to assure a type of rotating scheme. This lack of personnel is a 
consequence of the insecurity, but also of the impossibility of employing additional 
staff (instruction at national level). 
 
                                                 
8 The Provincial Health Office. Although all the private (religious)  health centres say that they 
supply preventive services, it should be noted that the family planning includes no other method 
than natural birth control. 
9 Bureau DiocØsain de DØveloppement de Ruyigi (Diocesan Development Office for Ruyigi). They 
supply the health centres in the provinces of Ruyigi, Cankuzo and Rutana. 
10 Burundi’s central purchasing office for medicines. 
11 The national pharmaceutical office.   50
                                                
Although the hospitals were not examined in detail, the lack of doctors in the 
provincial hospitals is striking. Apart from expatriate reinforcements (Cuban or 
linked to an external support), the only doctors present in a province are the 
provincial doctor and the medical director of the hospital, but these posts are not 
filled everywhere. In addition, we were able to observe that these doctors are very 
often solicited for training or other meetings in the capital, which leads to frequent 
and extended absences.   
 
The tariff-setting system in place 
 
Apart from some health centres where a flat fee is applied, the price of care in the 
health centres is composed of different elements: the consultation, the medical acts, 
the medicines and the medical material,  overnight stay for hospitalisation, each of 
which needs to be  paid for separately. The total price paid by the patient is 
composed by the various unit prices and thus depends on the unit price of the 
different care elements and the number of units needed; the unit price relates  
proportionally to the purchase price of the input. Consequently, for each health 
problem and each treatment provided, the price to pay varies. 
 
For patients, this means significant financial insecurity. The health personnel do not 
have a good overall view of the total price to be paid either. This leads to under-
estimating the financial load for the patient. This system makes verification (by the 
patient, by the community, or by the technical supervisors of the Ministry of Health 
or the NGO) difficult and renders comparison of the prices between different 
structures almost impossible  
  
Although a surprising diversity has been remarked in the field, it is possible to 
discern the following principles regulating the tariff-setting. 
•  The private health centres (Catholic network) apply cost recovery at 150% 
for medicines and a separate tariff system for medical acts, overnight stays 
and other care. Although preventive care is theoretically free, it was reported 
to us in several provinces that a (modest) payment is requested; for example, 
for vaccinations or antenatal consultations, to cover the costs of the card or 
the act of injection. 
•  In the public health centres, the medical acts are paid for separately, for each 
act, according to a list of prices provided by the BPS
12. The price of 
medicines is based on CAMEBU’s price list, increased (or subsidised) 
according to the level of cost recovery in place. For most of the public health 
centres, this rises to 115%. 
 
But, as illustrated in the annexed table, which gives an overview of the system in 
the different provinces, the application of these principles is far from homogeneous. 
The instructions received from the Ministry of Health allow the BPS and others 
concerned quite a wide interpretation in their application.  
•  The time of introduction of the cost-recovery system varies widely; 
•  The percentage of recovery varies between 100 and 120% in the public 
structures; in the province of Makamba, 50% is applied. 
•  The validity of the CAM card (giving a reduction of 80%) is not always 
recognized, or only applied for medical acts, or only in the health centres 
linked to the hospitals. 
 
 
12 Bureau provincial de santØ (provincial health office).   51
Subsidies and exemption systems 
In principle, in the public health centres, the ’indigence card’ obtained at the level of 
the commune remains valid for obtaining medicines and medical acts free of charge. 
Nevertheless, it was reported to us several times that this free care is limited to the 
acts, with the medicines being paid for at the usual price. Again, local or individual 
interpretations are common practice. The criteria for obtaining a certificate 
affirming destitution are not very clear. Such certificates are not common (see the 
exit survey of the health centre). 
 
At the moment, health care for the destitute is not subsidized. For the health centres, 
no compensation is foreseen for the ’loss of income’ associated with care for the 
destitute. Consequently, these centres accept exemption for this group very 
reluctantly. Under a new ministerial directive (Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
the Interior), in the future it is the community that will make the decisions about 
issuing these cards and will therefore decide on the number of people with the right 
to free care. The loss of income for the health centres will be registered in the 
accounts. It has been proposed that reimbursement should be shared between the 
commune (20%) and the Ministry of Health (80%), but in most provinces these 
proposed modalities are still unknown and the health committees are not yet 
functioning.  
 
Normally, the health structure can also decide whether a person is destitute and 
grant a reduction or allow a debt. Nevertheless, since the introduction of cost 
recovery, this effectively loss-making practice is tending to disappear and, in some 
provinces, specific instructions have been received to end it. Some interlocutors in 
the field have received orders to reimburse out of their own pocket the cost of health 
care provided to patients that can not pay. 
 
There are also certificates for repatriated people to obtain free care, issued by the 
UNHCR and validated by the commune. Their validity is reported as varying 
between 1 and 6 months. Patients referred from NGO structures (Supplementary 
Feeding Centre (SFC), Therapeutic Feeding Centre (TFC), mobile clinics, 
transported by an NGO) are looked after at no cost or at a reduced price, according 
to specific local agreements. In the private (religious) health centres, the communal 
certificates proving destitution are not recognized. The parish committees can grant 
free care, but on the condition of complete reimbursement to the  health centres. 
 
All state employees, including health agents, receive an insurance (mutuelle) card 
(referred to as the MFP), which gives the patient (and immediate family) the right to 
care at a reduced price (20% of the base price), for medical acts as well as for 
medicines
13. In the public health centres and in the private (religious) health centres, 
the MFP is accepted and gives the right to a price reduction for medical acts  (20% 
cost recovery) and for certain medicines (a specified list with current medicines).  
 
There is still a variable utilisation of the revenues collected in the health centres. 
Several interlocutors consider the present situation as a transition period in which 
several of the planned elements are not yet in place. In the public health centres, a 
system is foreseen in which the majority of the income generated by the sale of 
medicines should be utilised for purchasing new stocks via CAMEBU. This income 
is to be paid into local accounts managed by the health care manager (titulaire), 
                                                 
13. The possibility of obtaining this reduction for medicines at HC level is also recent (mid-2003). 
This was previously limited to the hospitals and prescriptions by a doctor. The HC can be 
reimbursed by Bujumbura.  assisted by a community representative (if the health committee is already 
functioning) and supervised by the BPS. Nevertheless, in some health centres, it 
was pointed out to us that a part of the income continues to be deposited at the level 
of the commune.  
 
Consequences of the new tariff-setting system 
 
Since the increase in tariffs, there has been a strong decline in attendance at the 
health centres (see the previous section). This reduces the global coverage for 
curative care. In some health centres, we also remark a reduction in the coverage for 
preventive activities such as vaccination. This can mainly be explained by the fact 
that the financial barriers cause more exclusion for the sick, which means less 
opportunity to refer children when they consult for health problems, despite the fact 
that these activities are presently subsidized by external funds. In the long run, this 
could have strategic implications for the Expanded Programme of Immunisation 
(EPI). 
 
It was not possible to make a detailed analysis of the attendance rates in all the 
provinces. The province of Cankuzo provides an opportunity to study the evolution 
in attendance rates at health centres with different types of tariff systems: cost 
recovery at 115% was introduced in July 2002, except in the health centres 
supported by MSF and the one health centre   linked to the provincial hospital 
where the price was maintained at 20%. In the absence of significant changes in the 
epidemiology in the province, the evolution of the attendance rates over time shows 
a clear link with the introduction of the tariff system.  
Evolution in the consultations in the HC in Cankuzo, 
according to the change in the cost-recovery system 
applied.
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Apart from patients who do not, or no longer attend a consultation, the structures 
indicate a strong increase in the number of patients incurring debts at the health 
centres. The long lists of debts in these centres are testament to the fact that the 
prices are unaffordable for a large number of patients (see the statistics for the 
’household’ survey and ’exit’ survey regarding patients’ recourse to debt). This 
applies as much to hospitalisation as to out-patient consultations. The amounts owed 
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vary according to whether an out-patient consultation or a hospitalisation
15 was 
required, but it is striking to observe that sums as modest as 300 to 500 Fbu can 
already constitute a problem for some patients. 
 
In order to recover these debts, the structures confiscate identity papers, CAM cards 
or personal belongings. The patients sometimes resort to forced labour in 
compensation for their debts: for example, working in a field belonging to the health 
centre or a nurse. It was reported several times that the practice continues of 
imprisoning patients as long as the bill remains unpaid. Some NGOs, or other civil 
actors, make payments to obtain the release of such patients.  
 
In several structures, the increase in the cost-recovery rate has led to an unexpected 
drop in income at the level of the health structures following the combination of 
an appreciable reduction in attendance rate and in the proportion of patients unable 
to pay. Several structures indicated to us that their average incomes are not reaching 
the amounts regarded as necessary for ensuring supplies of medicines. A rapid 
calculation was made on the basis of the financial needs for the annual supplies of 
medicines in the province of Cankuzo.  
 
Within the framework of the EDF programme, a budget for medicines of 54.000 
Euros is planned for the hospital and the 12 health centres in the province. It is 
estimated that a health centre should be able to bring in an average of 290 Euros per 
month. At the time of the visit, the monthly income reported at the level of the four 
health centres visited in Cankuzo, stood at an average of around 50.000 Fbu, or 41 
Euros
16, which covers only 15% of the sum required for renewing the stock of 
medicines. If the real recovery rate is similar in other provinces, it is impossible to 
replace the rotating medical stock only on the basis of income raised by the tariff 
system for patients
17. 
 
Other problems observed in connection with the tariff system in place regarded the 
quality and rationality of care. Payment per pill or other unit of medicine 
encourages treatments that are contrary to the national protocols, incomplete 
treatments or under-dosing. The flat fee determined as a proportion of the 
CAMEBU price
18, without any special subsidy for specific health problems or 
specific treatments, leads to the choice of less efficient medicines for serious 
problems. This not only affects the efficacy of the care, but also includes other 
potential disadvantages such as the introduction of resistance against antibiotics for 
example. Current examples of a defective quality of care mentioned during the 
interviews are: 
•  Prescription of a less expensive medicine when the protocol proposes a 
more efficient, but more expensive, medicine. For example, in the treatment 
of malaria, the use of quinine instead of Fansidar, despite the high 
resistance to the former; 
•  After the introduction of the new malaria protocol (ACT), we observe that 
some health centres continue to prescribe quinine (which is similarly 
                                                 
15 Most of the health centres have a limited capacity for overnight hospitalisation. Patients are kept in 
for a few days of observation or treatment. No standard referral criteria have been established. 
16 Applying the exchange rate of 1.226 Fbu for 1 euro. 
17 These calculations do not take into account the effects of devaluation, nor the difficulties of putting 
into practice CAMEBU’s legal right to convert Fbu into other currencies for issuing international 
tenders. Again, this does not take into account the delays in the supply system at provincial and 
central level. 
18 Burundi’s central purchasing office for medicines.    54
efficient, but with a lower adherence rate) because the tariff system based 
on unit pricing brings in much more profit than the price set for ACT;  
•  Reduction in the number of quinine perfusions from 3 to 2 per day for 
patients hospitalised for a severe malaria crisis; 
•  Treatment against malaria without testing by thick blood smear because this 
is too expensive for patients; 
•  Incomplete antibiotic treatments (lasting 2 or 3 days instead of a minimum 
of 5 days) or anti-malarial treatments; 
•  Less monitoring of hospitalised patients.  
 
Other examples of non-rational care linked with payment for each medical act:  
•  Attempt to access a hospital consultation where the price is more affordable 
than in those of the health centre (in Cankuzo for example); 
•  Attending a health centre with a lower tariff rather than the one closest to the 
patient; 
•  Delivery by episiotomy, which brings a higher financial return than a normal 
delivery (Ruyigi provides an example of an increase in episiotomies);  
•  Delayed consultation for a health problem that could be treated easily at the 
early stage, with a consequent deterioration in the illness and sometimes a 
need for more complex treatments. 
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PART SIX: 
 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
A. POSSIBLE  BIAS 
 
 
Bias linked to the selection and to the limitations of the study 
(representativeness of the sample) 
 
Population less than 5 km from HC 
We voluntarily limited the survey to population groups living less than 5 km from 
the health centre, in order to focus on financial accessibility of care and limit the 
influence of other problems of access, such as geographic access, for example. 
People living far from a health centre could experience additional transport 
problems, but in addition, as they are at a distance from the ’economic centre’ where 
a health structure generally is located, they could experience even greater poverty-
related problems. This limitation to the study could lead to as slight under-
estimation of the levels of poverty and thus also of financial exclusion to health 
care. 
 
Communes excluded for security reasons  
At the time of the field survey, security in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and 
Bubanza was very problematic. A large part of these two provinces therefore had to 
be withdrawn from the sample. In addition, security constraints were also 
encountered, to a smaller extent, in the provinces of Cibitoke and Bururi (see 
selection of the sample). As mortality and violence are generally linked, the 
mortality rate, as well as the other results regarding exclusion from care, could 
therefore be under-estimated.  
 
 
Bias linked to the classification into three groups 
 
Classification according to the theoretical system of tariff-setting 
The flat fee system applied in certain provinces of Burundi is a recent initiative, 
which started, except in the province of Karuzi, only a few months before the 
survey. Consequently, there are still differences between the system that should 
theoretically be applied and its practical implementation. This means that some HC 
are not yet systematically applying the flat fee. The classification of these HC in the 
flat fee group could over-estimate the problems of financial access to care in this 
group.  
  
Timing and installation of the general flat fee system in the province of Ruyigi 
A flat fee system set up by MSF-Holland began in mid-October. The survey in the 
province of Ruyigi (6 clusters out of 30) began at the end of November. This means 
that the flat fee system was set up during the three-month ’recall period’. 
Nevertheless, we have placed these clusters in the ’lump-sum’ group. This situation 
could have led to an over-estimation of the level of inaccessibility to care in Group 
A and contributed to an increase in the median and average prices of consultations.  
Consequently differences in access between the flat fee group and the other groups 
could be slightly underestimated.   56
 
Bias linked to the replies given by households 
 
Cultural and social bias in the replies 
The population is well aware of the existence of MØdecins Sans FrontiŁres and 
knows that it is an international medical organisation, and therefore foreign, which 
could have led to reticence. 
 
Additionally, we have sometimes observed people’s reticence to talk to us about 
their consultations with a traditional practitioner (healer). As a result, the attendance 
rate outside the public health or state-approved structures could be under-estimated. 
 
Within the culture of Burundi, it is not usual to open up to just anyone, especially if 
the person comes from a non-Burundian organisation, and are thus ’foreigners’. The 
issues relative to health could therefore be under-estimated (particularly 
gynaecological problems for women) and those relative to the appreciation of the 
health services could therefore by over-estimated. 
 
In addition, we noticed that this population experiences difficulty in speaking about 
violence-related problems that have direct repercussions on health. 
 
The formulation of certain questions could have offended the dignity of some heads 
of household who preferred to be evasive in order to avoid losing face. Thus we 
observed that many households in which the living conditions appeared very 
precarious refused to put themselves in the category of ’requiring perpetual 
assistance’. Only the holders of an official ’indigence card’ acknowledged that they 
fell into this category.  
 
In addition, the categorization as poor, very poor or well-off can vary according to 
the context. In a particularly poor zone, in identical conditions of poverty, some 
people may place themselves in the ’poor’ category because other people in the 
neighbourhood are even poorer. For example, depending on the district, some 
people in the province of Bujumbura Rural, living on the periphery of Bujumbura 
Mairie described themselves as poor, although they were visibly better off than 
other households living in more distant provinces or poorer zones, and vice versa. 
 
Exit survey for the users of the health centre 
During the exit survey, we observed that personnel of the HC adapted their practices 
as soon as it was clear that a survey was taking place. This could have led to under-
estimating the problems linked to the quality of care and to the tariff application. 
 
Replies from the family  
On some hillsides, we noted that there could be a divergence between the reactions 
of a husband and a wife in their replies to socio-economic questions. As the women 
were usually working in the family field and did no income-generating work 
outside, it was difficult for them to give exact replies to questions about money 
coming in to the family. However, the people replying to the questions were most 
often female. Consequently, the estimate of this income could be slightly under-
valued.   
 
Education   57
As most of the peasants in rural environments are barely numerically literate, it 
sometimes proved difficult to calculate their income and expenditure. These 
difficulties may have led to an under-estimate of both. 
 
Looting in the neighbourhood  
Given the country’s socio-economic conditions, the population experiences looting 
regularly. When these people have some income momentarily available beyond 
what is customary, they have a tendency to hide it. We even gathered information 
from people hiding in the bush because they had earned a large sum of money and 
did not dare remain in their homes for fear of looting. There was thus a tendency to 
hide such exceptional amounts. We think that this behaviour (which affected only a 
small number of people) could have created a slight bias in estimating the incomes 
of the population groups concerned by undervaluing them.  
 
Bias relative to the period of the study 
 
Timing and installation of a flat fee for malaria 
The installation throughout the country of a general flat fee system for malaria 
treatment, amounting to 100 and 200 Fbu depending on the age of the patient 
(tariffs for children and for adults), began on 15 November 2003. However, the 
survey began on 15 November and ended in mid-January 2004. This means that, 
taking into account the three-month ’recall period’, the official price was modified 
for a large part of the consultations during the period of the survey. The tariff 
averages for malaria consultations could therefore be slightly over-estimated in the 
survey.  
 
 
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS  
 
Mortality rates everywhere in the country give cause for concern  
 
General mortality 
In a high-income population (OECD countries), the mortality rate is 0.3 deaths per 
10.000 persons per day. In the population of a country experiencing stable 
development, the normal mortality rate is around 0.5 deaths per 10.000 persons per 
/day. In an emergency context, for example in a refugee camp, it is generally 
accepted that the situation remains under control if the global mortality rate for the 
population does not exceed 1 death per 10.000 per day. When in a similar context 
mortality rates rise between 1 and 2 deaths per 10.000 per day, the situation is 
labelled as an emergency and is to be taken seriously.   
 
The crude mortality rates (CMR) that we found overall in Burundi for the 
population surveyed are highly worrying in  all three population groups analysed. In 
the ’flat fee’ group, CMR is 1.2 deaths per 10.000 per day. In the ’cost-sharing’ and 
’cost-recovery’ groups CMR is still higher (1.9 and 1.6/10.000/day). However, these 
differences are at the limit of statistical significance. The rates are nevertheless three 
times higher than normal. 
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If we extend this to the population represented by the sample in the cost-recovery 
group, (4.922.241 people)
19 almost 800 people have died every day; we can 
conclude that in the three months preceding the survey, about 70.000 people died.  
 
The mortality rates for children under five years are even more alarming. In a stable 
situation in a developing country, the mortality rate for under-fives is 1 death per 
10.000 children per day. In an emergency context, the situation is considered to be  
￿under control￿ when mortality rates are below 2/10.000/day. Mortality rates 
between 2 and 4/10.000/day indicate a particularly alarming situation.  
 
In the ’flat fee’ group, the rate is 3.1 deaths per 10.000 children per day. In the ’cost-
recovery’ group, this rate is higher (3.3/10.000/day). In the ’cost-sharing’ group, the 
rate is still higher as it goes far beyond the threshold of 4/10.000/day 
(4.9/10.000/day). The differences between the groups are not statistically 
significant, but correspond to mortality levels that are three times higher than 
normal. 
 
If we extend these child mortality rates to the population represented (772.492 
people) in the cost-recovery group, about 255 children die daily and more than 
20.000 children died over the three-month period studied. 
 
We were also appalled by the fact that in the three groups investigated, around 40% 
of households had no children below five years, and by the unusually small 
proportion of children under five (lower than 17% of the total population). These 
rates, unusual for an African country, could be explained by the high mortality rates.  
 
The survey conducted by MSF in DR Congo
20 showed the indirect link between 
violence, mortality and access to healthcare. Only 4% of the mortality was due to 
direct violence, but this violence had caused the impoverishment of population 
groups, as they were constantly obliged to flee and abandon their harvests. This 
consequently resulted in many deaths linked to infectious diseases.  
 
As for DR Congo, the study shows that the principal cause of mortality is infectious 
disease, mainly malaria. The violence endured over ten years has destroyed survival 
coping mechanisms and rendered families more vulnerable to disease. One example 
of the population’s vulnerability:  although food security has improved compared 
with 2001, the food habits are still associated with behaviour in time of war. The 
population lives from day to day (daily consumption) and eats in small quantities. 
These reflexes, acquired during periods of insecurity are still present: out of fear of 
being attacked, people move at night towards town, further into the bush or closer to 
military posts). This process of night-time displacement damages the social fabric, 
the modes of production and consumption, while modifying the mode of daily 
survival, always without the possibility of planning for the future.  
 
Mortality due to malaria 
 
19 The survey clusters were selected out of a population living a maximum of 5km max. 
Extrapolation has been made from the whole population, without correcting for the higher 
mortality rates for the population groups living beyond the radius of 5 km from the health centre- 
where, as explained previously, mortality rates are likely to be  higher  (geographic access).  
20 Van Herp, M., Parque, V. et al., Mortality, violence and lack of access to health-care in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Disasters, 2003, 27 (2￿): 141-153.    59
                                                
Although there are no significant differences between the three groups as regards 
the mortality, the specific mortality due to malaria or fever is significantly lower  
(0.3%) for the ’flat fee’ group than for the ’cost-sharing’ group or the ’cost-recovery’ 
group (0.8%). Within the different groups, the same percentage of consultations is 
reported for malaria/fever. This phenomenon cannot therefore be explained by 
epidemiological differences. One explanatory factor could be the fact that despite 
the introduction of a flat fee for treatment against malaria, the tariffs remain very 
high for ’cost-sharing’ and ’cost-recovery’ groups (around 1.300 and 2.240 Fbu, or 
three and five times more respectively than for the ’flat fee’ group). There is 
therefore still a problem regarding financial access for an adequate treatment against 
malaria, which could have an influence on the specific mortality
21. This explanation 
is reinforced by the fact that in the cost-recovery group, patients wait for the illness 
to become more serious before seeking a consultation.  
 
 
The cost-recovery system excludes a large part of the population from health 
care 
 
Exclusion from consultations and treatment 
The cost-recovery system is applied in four-fifths of the country and concerns 
around 5 million people. In this almost generalised system in Burundi, almost one-
fifth of the population (17%) does not have access to any healthcare whatsoever, 
principally for financial reasons (82% of sick people have not consulted because of 
a lack of money). This means that almost one million people do not have access to 
health care in Burundi
22.  
 
To this one must add the fact that 4.8% of patients who have managed to pay for a 
consultation in a health centre have not received the treatment, or obtained only part 
of the treatment, mainly due to lack of money (for 63% of patients in this case).  
 
Even if we only take into account patients regarding themselves as seriously ill, 
there is a high rate of exclusion because 14.5% of them have no access to a 
consultation, mainly due to lack of money (90.7%). 
 
In the two systems that are regarded as exceptions because they are applied in health 
centres serving less than one million of the total population of Burundi (flat fee 
tariffs and cost sharing at 50%), the proportion of sick people without access to a 
consultation is more or less halved, decreasing from 17.4%, to 9.3 and 9.6% 
respectively. This corresponds to approximately 100.000 additional patients 
excluded from care. 
 
These results are better than those found in the cost-recovery group, but about 10% 
of sick people are still excluded from primary health care, principally due to lack of 
money (72.6 and 76.4%). To this must still be added 4.1% of patients in the flat fee 
 
21 Not only did the new malaria treatment protocol only begin on 15 November, with a flat fee set at 
100-200 Fbu, but it seems that there are still problems in the application of the tariff and the new 
protocol. 
22 17.4% of sick people do not have access to a consultation. The sample is limited to the population 
living less than 5 km from the health centre. Extrapolation was made to all households and to the 
population: 17.4% of the population, or 17.4% of 4.922.241 people do not have access to 
consultations, or 856.470 people are excluded from care. If we take into account the fact that the 
access to care for people living beyond 5 km from the HC is worse, we approach the figure of one 
million.    60
system who have consulted at a health centre, but who have not obtained a 
treatment, mainly because it was not available (for 58% of them). In the cost-
sharing system, an additional 5.4% of patients consulting at the health centre did not 
receive their treatment or received it only partially, mainly due to lack of money 
(for 50% of them). An exclusion of 10% of the population without a correct system 
for protecting the poor is contradictory to the objective of health for all. 
 
Comparing these figures with the results found by Save The Children in a study 
carried out in May-June 2002 and published in March 2003, the percentage of sick 
people who did not consult outside the family in the provinces de Gitega, Mwaro 
and Muramvya was 9.5%. In these provinces, the cost-recovery system was applied 
in February 2002. This difference can be explained by the fact that this 9% 
represents sick people who not only did not consult a medical structure, but also did 
not visit any pharmacy or traditional healer.   
 
Patients wait too long before being able to attend a consultation  
In the cost-recovery system, 36% of patients who considered their state of health as 
"not very serious" did not consult, principally through lack of money (for 58.7% of 
them). This means that for mainly financial reasons, the households refrain to go for 
a consultation until they judge the situation to be quite serious. This can be very 
dangerous because these households have no diagnostic knowledge and may arrive 
in the health centre or the hospital far too late. This practice could be a factor in 
explaining the disturbingly high mortality rate for malaria found in the cost-
recovery system. 
 
Of those who judged themselves to be seriously ill, 14.5% still did not present 
themselves for a consultation (for 91% of them, because of lack of money).  
 
In the two other systems easing the patient’s financial burden (flat fee and cost-
sharing), the lack of access to a consultation is around two times less important, 
because 14% and 16% respectively of sick people considered by their households to 
be "not very serious cases" did not consult, mainly for financial reasons (for 62 and 
54% of them).  
 
Finally, 8% of people judging themselves to be seriously ill have no access to a 
consultation, principally through lack of money (for 78 to 80% of them). 
 
Cost of care 
The average price of a consultation is more than four times higher in the cost-
recovery system (2254 Fbu) than in the flat fee system (472 Fbu). The average price 
of a consultation in the cost-sharing system is about half that in the cost-recovery 
system. 
 
If we want to compare with the Save The Children results, which gave the average 
price of a consultation (including hospitals), the total price of a consultation is 
comparable to the cost-recovery group. Save The Children obtains an average of 
2.478 Fbu per consultation, while in the present study within the cost-recovery 
system, the average is 2.254 Fbu.  
 
Recourse to extreme measures to pay for consultations 
Within the cost-recovery system, a large number of patients who paid for a 
consultation did so by using a coping mechanism that drew them deeper into   61
                                                
poverty. More than 80% of patient households paid for health care by incurring a 
debt (with neighbours, the family or the health centre), by selling a possession 
(livestock, part of the present or future harvest, or a piece of land), or by taking on 
additional work, generally paid labour at someone else￿s farm. This means that by 
drawing on a part of their production, their assets or their productive capacity, these 
households risk ￿ next time ￿ no longer being able to pay for essential household 
expenses and sinking even further into poverty.  
 
As regards the debts to health centres, some of the behaviour of those in charge of 
the health centres represents an abuse of human rights and the dignity of the people 
concerned. The interviewers and the NGOs interviewed reported to us many 
disturbing examples, such as forced labour, with patients being obliged to work in a 
field belonging to a health centre, the seizure of official documents, imprisonment 
of patients who could not pay for their care, etc. 
 
The presence of several sick people in the same household at the same time, or a 
chronic illness, makes payment for care even more onerous while also reducing the 
human capital necessary for the creation of income.  
 
Within the cost-sharing system at 50%, the number of households obliged to have 
recourse to extreme solutions decreases, remains very high (75%). With the flat fee 
system, this number drops further (48%), but still remains too high.  
 
Comparable results were found in the Save The Children survey. In the provinces 
studied, from 55% to 61% of households, depending on the level of poverty, had to 
sell possessions in order to pay for health care. Of these, 22 to 25% had to borrow 
from neighbours or friends to pay for the care
23. 
 
The whole of the population is living in extreme poverty and health care 
expenses aggravate this precarious situation still further  
 
Income and expenditure 
The population’s weekly income is extremely low. The median income per 
household in the three groups is considerably below the relative poverty threshold 
for Burundi. A relative poverty threshold specific to Burundi was calculated in the 
Burundian government’s preparatory text for a strategic framework for economic 
growth and the fight against poverty (PRSP
24), sent to the IMF and the World Bank 
in November 2003
25. The estimate was 53.650 Fbu per person per year, or 1.031,73 
Fbu/week. According to the ’EnquŒte prioritaire’ (priority survey) conducted in rural 
areas for a study by ISTEEBU (Institut de Statistiques et d￿Etudes du Burundi), 
69% of the population were living below this poverty threshold. In the MSF survey, 
the proportion of the population that found itself below this relative poverty 
threshold is still higher: in Groups A, B and C, respectively 86%, 85% and 91% of 
the population lies below the poverty threshold.  
 
 
23 International Programme Centre for Health Economics, Coping with community health financing: 
Illness costs and their implications for poor households￿ abilities to pay for health care and 
children￿s access to health services, study conducted for Save the Children UK, March 2003. 
24 PRSP: Poverty reduction strategic paper. 
25 Government of Burundi, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), Bujumbura, 
November 2003, p. 11.   62
                                                
Comparing with the internationally agreed poverty threshold used by the World 
Bank for all the countries of the world, which is 1 USD per person per day, we can 
say that over 99% of the Burundian population in rural settings falls below the 
extreme poverty threshold.  
 
In the study conducted for Save The Children in 2002, the annual average 
expenditure per person amounts to 38.013 Fbu whereas the average expenditure per 
person per year within the framework of our study comes to 26.000 Fbu. This could 
be explained by the geographical variability of the sample. The Save The Children 
study was conducted over three provinces generally regarded as relatively well-off. 
Our study covers the whole of the country, and the preparatory text for the PRSP 
prepared by the Burundian government for the IMF not only stresses the rural-urban 
disparities, but also the regional disparities.  
 
According to this document, drawing on a 1998 survey, the provinces that suffered 
most from the conflict in terms of poverty are Bubanza, Cibitoke and Karuzi. In the 
provinces of Rutana and Karuzi, where the poverty levels were already particularly 
high before the war, the rates are alarming, exceeding 70%
26. Finally, the provinces 
of Bubanza, Cibitoke and Bujumbura Rural also have poverty rates that have risen 
considerably, although they count among the most ’well off’ provinces in the 
country. Finally, in some geographical regions, the conflict has had repercussions, 
notably on the plains of Bugesera, Imbo and Moso
27.  
 
In addition, as the fighting then moved elsewhere in the country, our interviewers 
also found that the provinces of Ngozi and Kayanza, and the frontier communes in 
the east of the provinces of Ruyigi and Cankuzo (a strip from Kininya to Cankuzo) 
are also affected by the war. Other provinces, such as Kirundo and Muyinga, which 
might appear richer, are in reality concealing a great deal of poverty. The livestock 
encountered on some large properties in fact belong to a minority from Bujumbura. 
These provinces give the impression of regions that are very neglected.     
 
During the survey, it was noted that despite the ceasefire, the population was 
continuing to adapt its way of life to the situation of insecurity that has prevailed 
over more than ten years of civil war. Rural development activities have suffered 
greatly from this. For example, travel to markets to sell livestock or agricultural 
produce remains limited. The seasonal work migration is also limited. The violence 
around Bujumbura in particular poses a problem of access to the capital. 
Agricultural work has also been greatly disrupted by the insecurity, with land 
abandoned for several years and a shift in crops towards growing tubers or root 
crops. 
 
The MSF survey and a study carried out by Oxfam in Gitega
28 clearly shows that 
the less well-off depend strongly, or almost exclusively, on the possibility of outside 
labour for acquiring income, particularly liquid currency. The chance of finding 
outside work varies strongly according to the season and the type of agricultural 
land in the region. On average, a peasant succeeds in finding manual work for two 
 
26 ISTEEBU, ￿EnquŒte prioritaire 1998￿. 
27 Op. cit. 
28Oxfam-UK, Food security and income programme, report of a socio-economic evaluation of Giheta 
and Makebuko, period evalued: November 2002-November 2002, Gitega, January 2003. See also, 
Establishment of the socio-economic situation referring to the action zone of the BUR 02 
programme (communes of Cankuzo and Cendajuru), October 1999.   63
                                                
or three days a week. The average return for a day’s labour in the fields depends on 
the region and the season, but lies between 250 and 400 Fbu, which represents about 
three times less than the extreme poverty threshold. The presence of cattle also 
varies according to the region. Cattle are the property of a very well-off strata of the 
population. The only livestock reported by the very poor are guinea pigs and 
rabbits.    
 
Compared with these extremely low incomes, the total price of a consultation 
represents an enormous proportion of the expenditure or income of a household. 
This proportion varies considerably according to the group because in the cost-
recovery system the average price that has to be paid for a consultation represents 
about 12 working days income. Within the flat fee system, the consultation 
represents the income from about 3‰ working days, while within the health centres 
applying cost sharing at 50%, the income from 6‰ working days is required.  
 
In the results of the survey carried out by ISTEEBU in 1998, it was noted that 
health expenses represents 2.4% of the total expenditure of a Burundian household, 
breaking down differently for the rich and for the poor. The poor population devotes 
3.2% of its total expenditure to health, while the ’non-poor’ devotes only 1.9% for 
this.  
 
If we compare with the present study, the price of an average consultation in a 
health centre in the cost-recovery system represents about 15% of the annual 
expenditure of a household. Adding on the costs for hospitals, which, although not 
investigated in the course of this survey, are very high (all the hospitals in Burundi, 
except for those in Makamba, Karuzi and Kinyinya and a part of the hospital in 
Ruyigi, supported by MSF, are presently managed according to the principle of 
financial autonomy, commonly referred to as ￿autonomie de gestion’), we can say 
that in the population dependent on health structures applying cost recovery, the 
health care expenses represent well over 2.4% of monthly expenditure. The health 
care expenditure  in the cost-recovery system is therefore presently very high, not to 
say catastrophic, for a household budget
29. 
 
 
The system for protecting the poor functions badly or not all 
 
The system 
In the ’cost-recovery’ group, which represents four-fifths of the population, the 
destitute face a catastrophic situation. Whereas just over 20% of the vulnerable 
people in this payment system do not have access to consultations, mainly for 
financial reasons, only 0.8% of those using the health services possess an ’indigence 
card’ and can obtain free care. This means that, in the cost-recovery system, there is 
no system of protection for the destitute to ensure healthcare, which is contrary to 
the principle of equity. 
 
In the ’flat fee’ and ’cost-sharing’ system, respectively 5.9% and 7.2% of health-
service users hold a ’indigence card’. This means that also here a large number of the 
destitute do not have an ’indigence card’. 
 
 
29 Ke Xu, Evans, David B., Household catastrophic health expenditure: A multi-country analysis, 
Lancet, Volume 362, Issue 9378, 2003, p. 111.   64
                                                
In the ’flat fee’ group, this situation can be explained by the fact that at the time of 
the survey, following contradictory instructions from one of the provincial health 
authorities, a large number of those holding ’indigence cards’ saw these cards 
refused by the healthcare personnel. In the ’cost-sharing’ group specific to 
Makamba, the situation is different. As the destitute need to be taken in charge by 
the community and not by a third party, the community has a tendency to under-
estimate their number in order to avoid significant financial losses.  
 
Even if the NGO Cordaid reimburses the health centres, the health committees 
experience this situation as a problem. Cordaid reimburses in kind, meaning with 
medicines and medical products, which health centres and the health committee 
perceive as a loss of cash income. As in the other systems, the direct payment of 
consultations is regarded as more worthwhile because it generates revenues that are 
then immediately available at the level of the HC. Given the extreme poverty of the 
country, there is too strong a temptation for a large number of actors to ’draw on’ 
this financial manna in one way or another. 
   
The present exemption systems for the destitute are often blocked by the lack of 
financial compensation for the care provided to patients that do not pay. 
Theoretically, it is the communes on whom the responsibility falls for paying the 
healthcare bill for the poor in the health centres. The communes, lacking the 
financial resources, are rarely able to do so. For example, in the province of Ngozi, 
only the commune of Ngozi reimburses health centres for the health costs of the 
destitute.  
 
In addition, it is regrettable that the criteria for destitution, and the identification of 
the destitute, are heterogeneous and not coordinated by the public services. In some 
provinces (for example, Kirundo), a similar waiver system for the poor functions 
with regard to education. The community members contribute to an education fund 
according to their ability to do so. Unfortunately this identification process of the 
poor is limited to the costs of schooling and is not valid for health.  
 
The bad functioning of the waiver system for the poor is almost generalised . It is 
due to a confusion in the definition of who is destitute and the identification 
procedures for those families, but also to a lack of transparency, even to a 
clientelism embedded in the present system. The exemption system has become a 
sectoral and clientelist practice. It is no longer established according to objective 
criteria corresponding to the economic situation of the family or to the living 
conditions of individuals, and the recognition of these by the community.  
 
Perceptions: "One can be poor, but still have the strength to farm"
30 
In general, for the communal and health authorities, if people are capable of 
working, they are not destitute. That is generally why the categories for the destitute 
are limited to people who cannot access land: old people, the handicapped, and 
Twa
31 families who have no land and are usually excluded from working on other 
people’s property.  
 
But we have seen that in the cost-recovery system, a consultation represents 12 days 
of labour , which puts a considerable strain on the household budget. In addition, if 
several family members are ill, for example during a malaria epidemic or as the 
 
30 Interview with an administrator, December 2003. 
31 Burundian ethnic group of Pygmy origin.   65
                                                
result of other infectious diseases, the ability to work is dramatically reduced as a 
consequence of the illness.   For people dependent on a daily subsistence economy 
this leads to catastrophic health expenses within a system without any social welfare 
insurance. 
 
Although the system of ’indigence cards’ is not functioning well, the insurance 
(mutuelle) system giving reductions to public employees is more efficient. 
However,  this category cannot be considered as vulnerable and it concerns only a 
small proportion of the population. 
 
 
The sickness insurance card  (CAM) pre-payment system hardly functions 
anymore 
 
The CAM card is hardly used any more and has officially been withdrawn in some 
provinces. In some of these provinces, the foreseen reduction of 80% applies only to 
the price of the consultation and the medical acts, but not to medicines, which is the 
major cost. 
 
Following the results of our exit survey at the health centre, only 1% of patients 
possess this card. In the cost-recovery system, it is still operating to a small degree, 
as 6.8% of patients at the exit of the health centre still held a CAM card. In 
comparison with the Save The Children study, the percentage of those in possession 
of a CAM card varies considerably: in the three provinces studied (Gitega, 
Muramvya and Mwaro), 20% of the population still held this card. This can be 
explained by the very strong geographic disparity observed in Burundi with regard 
to health care. The ’cost-recovery’ group in our study represents a system of 
payment, but its results do not reflect the geographic disparities that could exist 
between the provinces. Furthermore,  the CAM card has progressively disappeared 
in parallel to the generalisation of cost recovery. Between the SCF study in 2002 
and this present one, the interest in buying a CAM card may have greatly decreased. 
 
 
The flat fee tariff for 'malaria treatment' is not respected in many places  
 
The field survey was conducted as from mid-November for the ’flat fee’ health 
centres, from mid-December for the ’cost-sharing’ health centres and from January 
for the ’cost-recovery’ group. The general flat fee for malaria treatment
32 established 
by the government for the whole country at 100 Fbu for children and 200 Fbu for 
adults, began officially on 15 November 2003. It was rendered possible by 
financing from external funds. 
  
The patients were questioned over a three-month period, but the questions posed 
referred only to the most recent episode of illness, which had often occurred during 
the same month. For all the groups interviewed, at least half of this period coincided 
with the implementation of the new malaria protocol for artesunate-amodiaquine to 
be used as a first-line treatment in Burundi- with the price set at 100 or 200 Fbu
33.  
 
 
32 This flat fee covers consultations and treatment, but not laboratory tests. 
33 Thanks mainly to funding from the Belgian development co-operation agency, ECHO and 
different sections of MSF.    66
                                                
The results of the survey showed that in the ’cost-recovery’ system patients still pay 
an average of around 1.000 Fbu for malaria treatment. Even if the period of 
application of the new protocol and the new tariff concerned at least half of the 
recall period, it is not normal to still find such a high average price for a malaria 
treatment. These figures show, without being able to quantify the extent of the 
practice, that a large number of the ’cost-recovery’ health centres are not applying 
the tariff imposed by the government, or that these health centres abuse the use of 
quinine, which brings in a lot more money for them (its price continues to be 
calculated by the unit), although this medicine should only be used as a second-line 
treatment.    
 
 
The structural dysfunctions in all the existing health-care payment systems are 
further exacerbating inequity 
 
The quest for personal advantage 
As was observed in a summary report of a socio-anthropological study of the access 
to care in five West African countries
34, health personnel or the administration often 
invoked salary-related problems to justify the quest for additional pecuniary 
advantages in the exercise of their functions. This quest can take several forms, such 
as the parallel sale of medicines, over-pricing, embezzlement of material for 
personal use, etc.   
 
The incentives given by some NGOs, notably through the funding of European 
Union or ECHO projects, are not sufficient to end these ￿parallel income￿ practices. 
This was confirmed by some members of the health personnel. The consequence of 
this situation is that health and administrative personnel often obfuscate 
transparency in the management of health centres, for example, by blocking the 
possibility of external managers or supervisors in the health centres.  
 
Parallel sales of medicines 
In Burundi, as in several other poor countries, circuits exist for the sale of medicines 
outside the official public sector outlets; this exists at different levels and involves 
different actors. For example, many people told us about the existence of private 
pharmacies run by health personnel. It was reported that some embezzled drugs go 
through Tanzania. Such embezzlement makes individual enrichment/ additional 
income  possible .  
 
Embezzled material for personal use 
Medical material supposedly belonging to the health centre is embezzled for 
personal use. We noticed, for example, that a large number of thermometers given 
to the health centres were used only by health personnel in their own homes. 
 
Health committees representing local elites and authorities 
Too often, the health and management committees have not been elected directly by 
the local population and thus are not representative of the people. They are more 
representative of local elites or from the local administrative authorities. It is very 
 
34 Jaffre, Y. and Sardan, J.-P. O. (dir.), ’Urban health’ project (UNICEF-French development co-
operation agency), Les dysfonctionnements des systŁmes de care, Rapport du volet socio-
anthropologique, EnquŒtes sur l￿accŁs aux care dans cinq capitales d￿Afrique de l￿Ouest, sl., sd., pp. 
18, 168-173 The dysfunctions of the care systems, Report on the socio-anthropological aspects, 
Enquiries into the access to care in five capitals of West Africa.    67
                                                
rare that the interests of the poor or vulnerable people are represented
35. Taking this 
situation into account, the health and management committees do not constitute a 
possible recourse for the population in cases where health personnel’s behaviour is 
not acceptable. This situation was also recorded in the report on the study carried 
out in the five capitals of West Africa
36.  
 
Monitoring, training and installing inefficient health and management committees  
Faced with the dysfunctional management of the health centres, but also the 
problematic quality of care and the negative attitudes towards patients (see below), 
projects for training and supervising personnel have multiplied over several years. 
In this context, where poverty and corruption are linked, such training and 
supervision are often ineffective
37.  
 
The same remark could be made for the installation of the health and management 
committees
38. For the most part, these committees were not set up at the request of 
their communities. In general, their installation is done by external actors. Often this 
set-up is limited to their creation, with some additional training and the conception 
of job profiles for the committee members. There is no follow-up, neither by the 
BPS nor by the external actors. As a result, the management of the centres lacks 
transparency and there is hardly any documentation on how decisions are taken.  
 
 
The quality of care and patient reception need to be improved 
 
In the three payment systems ￿ ’flat fee,’ ’cost-sharing’ and ’cost-recovery’ ￿ the 
percentage of clinical examinations performed on patients in the health centre is 
low, only around 10%. For children under five years, the figures remain just as low 
(13, 12 and 11%respectively). Among patients complaining of fever, less than half 
of them had their temperature taken (respectively 46, 28 and 36%).  
 
In the three payment systems, the care providers asked to see the vaccination cards 
of children under five years in only two cases. This indicates how often 
opportunities are missed for referring children from the curative services for 
vaccination. 
 
The average length of a consultation is similar between the 3 systems. It varies from 
six minutes for the ’flat fee’  group to 6 minutes 48 seconds for the ’cost-sharing and 
’cost-recovery’ groups. This difference is not significant. Overall, the waiting time 
for consultations is very long. In Group C, 49% waited for more than one hour and 
24% for three hours or longer. 
 
In the three groups of HC investigated, we observed that simple quality indicators 
are grossly insufficient . They share a similar urgent need to improve the quality. 
There is thus no relation between the price paid by the patient and the quality of 
care in Burundi. If the total cost of consultations increases, the quality of care does 
not automatically increase, contrary to preconceived ideas. In the study carried out 
 
35 Lay Volunteers International Association (LVIA), Setting up of the health committees and 
management committees in the priority health centres of the Cibitoke, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuzo 
Provinces, Summary of  April 16 ￿ June 20, 2003.  
36 JAFFRE, Y. et de SARDAN J.-P. O., op. cit., p. 174. 
37 Same meaning as, op. cit., p. 4. 
38 Same meaning as, op. cit., p. 29.   68
for Save The Children, it was also observed that there are no significant connections 
between the prices paid and the quality of care.  
 
These ’objectivised’ indicators of the lack of quality in the care provided in the HC 
contrast strongly with the almost general appreciation by patients for the care 
received. Most of them said they were satisfied and would return to the HC visited. 
This could indicate that patients  lack  alternatives or even lack reference standards 
for good care . The lever for change towards more quality must therefore come from 
outside the patient-provider relationship (at the national and international level). 
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PART SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conflict still has consequences for poverty and mortality   
 
The results of our survey show that ￿in spite of political progress in Burundi- the 
precarity of the population remains unchanged. The high mortality rates are 
extremely worrying and extreme poverty is almost generalised. These disturbing 
results are to be taken seriously, 
 
The survey shows mortality rates three times higher than those of a stable situation 
and are well above the internationally recognised thresholds that indicate an 
emergency situation. The main causes of mortality are infectious diseases, with 
malaria as the main killer.  
 
The violence has led to a scarcity of goods and services, supply and transport 
problems, an increase in thefts, and the destruction of family possessions. Daily life 
is still characterised by the fear of violence and the consequences of insecurity 
(displacement etc.). By impoverishing the population, violence leads to a weakening 
of the immune defence system and favours infections. Even  when violence ends, its 
consequences remain and continue over time.  
 
The association between poverty and ill-health is now well known. Populations in 
extreme destitution and suffering from malnutrition become ill much faster and die 
much faster from the consequences of their illness. The WHO’s Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health
39 reminds us of this direct link between poverty and 
sickness , and confirms that health is a prerequisite for economic development.   
 
 
One million Burundians do not have access to health care 
 
The study shows that the cost-recovery system in Burundi excludes almost one 
million people (856.470 people)
40. The effect of the cost-recovery system on this 
exclusion is such that the right to health, registered within the national policy of the 
Ministry of Health, is put at risk. 
 
On top of that there are ill persons that consult the health centre but are deprived of 
adequate treatment, mainly for financial reasons. 
About 80% of the households that are able to pay the price of consultation is 
obliged to resort to extreme solutions to find the money, such as incurring debt to 
neighbours, selling a part of the harvest, some cattle, a piece of land, etc. This risk 
for further impoverishment by health costs concerns 3 million people. 
 
                                                 
39 World Health Organisation, CMH Support Unit, Investing in health: A summary of the findings of 
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2002.  
40 The cost-recovery system is applied in the public health centres covering 4.922.241 people and 
17.4% of sick people do not have access to consultations. Extrapolation was made in all households 
with the same income.   70
Although more than 85% of Burundians are living below the relative poverty 
threshold for Burundi (less than 1 USD per week), in the prevailing cost-recovery 
system, the cost of health care (medical acts, medicines and laboratory tests) is 
borne entirely by the patients. The state takes responsibility for the infrastructure 
and for salaries, in both cases completely inadequate.  
 
However, the Burundian population does not have the capacity to bear even the 
costs of essential heath care. The human price of this cost-recovery policy should 
not be under-estimated  
 
 
Access to care for all requires appropriate means  
 
The 2003 budget of the Ministry of Health was estimated at 2.2% of the total 
budget. However, ensuring access to care for all, with particular attention to the 
most vulnerable, requires appropriate means. The essential expenditure required for 
health cannot be assumed by the national budget as it stands at present.  
 
It is the responsibility of donors to mobilize additional funds for health . 
 
At the institutional donors’ conference held in Brussels in January 2004, donor 
countries pledged sums amounting to about 810 million Euros, or 1.032 million 
USD. The main themes focused on at the conference were demobilisation, and the 
return and reinsertion of refugees and displaced. 
 
These subjects are crucial for the future of the country, but the future of the health 
sector and the education sector, which are also very important, was not discussed at 
all. The allocation of the sums promised has not yet been made public.  
 
Access to care for all merits special attention by donors. External resources for the 
health sector should be utilised in order to guarantee improved access to care for the 
population. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
A health care system accessible to all 
 
In view of the results of the survey and the accumulated experience in the field, 
MSF observes that the cost-recovery system excludes a large part of the population. 
In fact, as this tariff system is being applied in most of the rural regions, almost one 
million Burundians,  are completely excluded from essential primary healthcare. 
 
The problem of the financial access to healthcare must be seriously reconsidered. 
An appropriate general policy must allow for access to healthcare for all, including 
the most vulnerable population groups. 
 
The two exceptions to the national system that were studied during this survey 
(reducing tariffs to less than 50% or a flat fee) have been able to moderate 
somewhat the negative effects of the present tariff system, but remain inadequate 
for guaranteeing financial access for the whole of the population. 
 
In particular, given the precarious state in which the population is living following 
the war, exclusion is unacceptable. Any actor working in the health domain must 
realise just how serious this situation is and draw conclusions from these disturbing 
results.  
 
This alarming state of affairs is the responsibility of every actor, whether 
government or non-government, operational or donor. 
 
   Given the gravity of the situation in terms of the prevailing mortality, 
poverty and exclusion from essential healthcare, MSF is committed to 
working towards free care. 
 
This would make it possible to remove an important financial obstacle to the access 
to care for the majority of patients. Apart from the abolition of a direct financial 
obstacle to care, free healthcare could offer other advantages. Compared with the 
other systems, free care makes it possible to avoid certain management problems in 
the health centres. In fact, given the country’s extreme poverty, the money generated 
by the sale of medicines represents a significant financial interest at several levels. 
A free care system would make it possible to avoid both bad financial management 
at the health centres and minimise conflicts generated around this revenue, from 
which the population itself rarely benefits. 
 
 
Particular attention to the vulnerable 
 
Paradoxically, although the most vulnerable require closer follow-up of their state 
of health, it is this layer of the population that has the least access to primary 
healthcare services. 
 
Contrary to the proposals in the preparatory text on the fight against poverty 
(prepared for the attention of the IMF and the World Bank), the objective of 
ensuring access to healthcare for these population groups cannot just be a medium-  72
term objective, but must constitute an immediate goal. Healthcare must be a priority 
and can not be secondary to economic objectives. 
 
First of all, because it is a question of humanity: the right to health is a right for all. 
The mortality rates show that the lack of access to care for these population groups 
is putting their lives in danger. Next, because it is a question of economics: the 
proportion of vulnerable people in Burundi is large and risks hampering the 
development of the human capital necessary for the country’s growth. 
 
The government and health actors both have a responsibility to protect the most 
vulnerable and poorest. This protection in terms of health services is required at two 
levels:  
  •  Protection regarding the access to essential care; 
  •  Protection regarding the impoverishing effect of healthcare expenditure. 
The present systems in no way protect vulnerable people and do not mitigate the 
exclusion of people too poor to pay for care. The allocation of exemptions presently 
does not correspond to the vulnerability indicators reported in the population.  
 
   Specific attention must be paid to the most vulnerable, both in principle 
and in practice.  
 
 
A dialogue on financial access to care involving all the actors 
 
Offering health care without a direct financial contribution by the patients of course 
implies that other financial resources are allocated to ensure health services. The 
Burundian government, in line with its budget and the external aid received, could 
set up a subsidised healthcare system in the public sector. 
 
With the objective of conducting an in-depth discussion on the importance of health 
as a pre-requisite to the economic development of the country, and the urgency of 
making the necessary resources available to the health sector, specific time and 
attention should be given to financial access to healthcare. This calls for a specific 
reflection process and a close co-ordination between all actors concerned. This 
dialogue must take place both at the national and the international level (Ministries 
of Health, Ministries of Finance and of the Interior, institutional donors and the 
NGOs involved in the health and economic development sectors). 
 
 
Information and follow-up 
 
As regards the different experiments underway in the domain of primary healthcare, 
it is essential to share in further exchanges of information and to continue to study 
the subject. 
 
For example, the access to healthcare had never previously been investigated and no 
systematic monitoring system has been set up to evaluate the impact on access of 
changes in the health financing policy. Access to care is an important indicator to 
follow in order to be able to evaluate effectiveness, coverage and equity within the 
health services.   73
 
Regular simple quantitative studies should be conducted, with a few key 
questions in order to reach a better understanding of how the situation is evolving. 
This can facilitate reflection on the most appropriate system of access to healthcare 
for the country. The present survey has shown the crucial importance of including 
population-based data in order to get a realistic assessment of access problems. It is 
the only way of obtaining information on the exclusion of sick people (the non-
users). Similar to the monitoring of the nutritional situation, for example, a regular 
follow-up system should be set up.  
 
The present survey is limited to first-line care in rural regions. The need for a 
similar survey on  access to healthcare in urban settings is imperative. In addition, 
given the information collected in the margin of this survey in the health centres and 
the many problems reported from experience in the field, there should be an urgent 
evaluation of the access at hospital level. 
 
The required financial autonomy foreseen in the ￿autonomous management￿ set-up 
of the hospitals poses serious questions relative to the financial access to care;  these 
unaffordable fees will exclude patients affected by serious ailments requiring 
specialised investigation, hospitalisation, obstetrical or surgical interventions. The 
prices paid by the patients are higher in hospitals than in primary care, therefore the 
problem of access is likely to be more acute and its impoverishing effect through 
catastrophic health expenditure will be all the more serious. We recommend that a 
survey on financial access at hospital level be carried out as quickly as possible. 
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Annex 1: Income and expenditure by province (in BIF) 
 
 Average 
expenditure 
Median 
expenditure 
Average 
income 
Median 
income 
Karuzi  1.203   700  1.542  810 
Cankuzo*  2.659  1.300 and 1.500 2.974  2.000 and 
1.265 
Ruyigi*  1.674  1.000 and 2.125 2.117  1.000 and 
1.500  
Kayanza  2.091 1.000  1.984  1.000 
Mwaro  3.134 2.000  2.153  1.800 
Cibitoke  3.858 2.500  4.162  2.500 
Kirundo  1.427 1.000  1.557  1.200 
Rutana  833 600  817  600 
Muyinga  2.861 2.000  2.804  2.000 
Ngozi  1.563 1.000  1.770  1.000 
Muramvya  2.823 2.000  3.177  2.000 
Bururi  4.913 3.000  4.572  3.000 
Gitega  2.485 1.250  2.646  1.500 
* These provinces have been investigated in two or three epidemiological surveys, because different  
types of tariff systems are applied in the same province  (flat fee and cost-recovery system). A 
weighted average was calculated. The two medians (A and C) are indicated, one for each tariff 
category. 
 
In the provinces studied, those with the lowest average incomes (below 2.000 Fbu 
per week) are, in increasing order, Rutana, Karuzi, Kirundo, Kayanza and Ngozi. 
The provinces in  the higher income range   (above 2.000 Fbu per week) are, in 
increasing order, Ruyigi, Mwaro, Gitega, Muhinga, Muramvya and Cibitoke.  
  
The  difference in median values for expenses and income between the two tariff 
categories in the province of Ruyigi can be explained by the fact that the catchment 
areas for the flat fee group are all situated in the Moso region, which has suffered 
greatly from the war. If we take into account the median for this sub-region only, 
this is, after Karuzi and Rutana, one of the poorest  of Burundi.  
 Annex 2: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
LE MENAGE  
 Date:  ￿..  /  ￿..  /  ￿..  Health centre:   
 Province:    Team  (names):  
 Commune:    Cluster N°:   
 Zones:    Family N°:   
1.  Breakdown of the family by age 
bracket: 
   
Include people who sleep and eat under 
the same roof at least 3 days a week  
      0-4 years:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. people  
5-14 years:￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿...people 
15-50 years:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.. people  
 > 50 years￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ people 
       How many people live in the 
household?  
   TOTAL        ￿￿￿￿￿..￿.. people 
MORTALITY> 
       2.   Were there any deaths in 
the family in the past three 
months? 
   Yes 
   No   Go to question 4 
3.   Description of the 
deaths: 
 Age 
(months 
or years) 
Cause 
◊ 
1
st 
death 
  
2
nd 
death 
  
3
rd 
death 
  
4
th 
death 
  
5
th 
death 
  
Total:    
Total 
under 5 
years 
  
 
◊ Causes of death 
 
1.    Malaria / Fever  
2.  Respiratory condition (cough, etc.) 
3. Diarrhoea  
4. Malnutrition   
5.  Problem linked with giving birth  
6. Violence   
7. Other  (specify)  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
MORBIDITY 
4.   Has a member of your family been ill over the past three months? 
(include health problems linked to pregnancy / a normal delivery is not an illness) 
   YES      NO 
Give the age of the person most recently 
ill ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿   (years / months) 
             The sex of the person most recently ill             Man           
   Woman 
End the 
questionnaire 
and go to 
another family 
 
5.   Does the family regard the health problem as: 
 
   Serious  
   Not serious  
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6.   What type of illness is the person 
suffering from? 
 
  Only one reply (the main one)  
 
   1. Malaria / Fever 
   2. Diarrhoea  
   3. Respiratory 
condition (cough, etc.) 
   4. Complicated 
birth 
   5. Other (specify)   
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
7.   Were you treated? …………     1. With traditional products? 
   2. With ’modern’ medicines? 
   3. With traditional and modern 
medicines? 
   4. Without medication 
 
ACCESS TO CARE  
     8.   Have you seen a doctor, nurse, healer or pharmacist for this episode of illness 
(somebody outside the family)? 
   YES      NO  
⇓  ⇓ 
Who exactly have you seen?   Why not?  
 
    HC at: 
￿￿￿￿￿
￿. 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
Other  
HC: 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 
 
 
Healer 
Mobile clinic 
   Pharmacist 
Somebody 
selling medicines  
   Hospital at 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
   Other       
￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
How much 
have you 
paid for 
care? 
How much have 
you paid for 
care? 
How much have you 
paid for care? 
   1. Not seriously 
enough ill 
   2. Lack of money 
            3. Not enough 
confidence in the HC 
personnel 
   4. Lack of transport 
/  HC too far away  
   5. The HC has no 
medicines 
   6. The HC 
personnel is absent, 
HC closed 
   7. Security problem 
   8. Debt owed to the 
HC 
   9. Other (specify) 
￿. 
 
How much have you paid 
for care? 
    
 
    
 
    
      
 
I
 
pai
d 
￿
￿
￿.
.. 
   I
 
do
n’t 
kn
ow 
  For 
the 
tota
l 
  In 
part 
I
 
paid 
￿
￿
￿... 
   I
 
don’
t 
kno
w 
  For 
the 
total 
  In 
part 
I 
paid 
￿￿
￿... 
   I 
don’t 
know 
  For the 
total 
  In part  I 
paid 
￿￿￿..
. 
   I 
don’t 
know 
  For the 
total 
  In part   77
⇓ 
Continue in 
'Care 
received' 
Section V 
⇓ 
Continue 
below 
⇓ 
Continue below 
⇓ 
Continue in Socio-
economic' 
Section VI, Page 5 
 
 
  Why not at the 
HC at ...? 
 
   1. Not 
seriously enough ill
   2. Lack of 
money 
   3. Not enough 
confidence in the HC
care personnel  
   4. Lack of 
transport /  HC too 
far away  
   5. The HC has 
no medicines 
   6. The HC 
personnel is absent, 
HC closed 
   7. Security 
problem 
   8. Debt owed 
to the HC 
   9. This type 
of care not 
available at the HC 
   10. Other 
(specify) 
￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
Why not at the 
HC at ...? 
 
   1. Not 
seriously enough ill 
   2. Lack of 
money 
   3. Not enough 
confidence in the HC 
care personnel  
   4. Lack of 
transport /  HC too 
far away  
   5. The HC has 
no medicines 
   6. The HC 
personnel is absent, 
HC closed 
   7. security 
problem 
   8. Debt owed 
to the HC 
   9. This type of 
care not available at 
the HC 
   10. Other 
(specify) 
￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
 
  ⇓ 
Continue in 'Care 
received' 
Section V  
 
⇓ 
Continue in 'Socio-
economic 
Section VI, Page 5 
 
 
 
V.  PRIMARY CARE RECEIVED (!Only for care in the HC!) 
 
9.   Did you spend a 
night in the HC? 
  
  
YES     If yes, how many nights? 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
NO 
     10.   Was a test prescribed? (samples: blood, urine, sputum or other) 
   YES      NO  
Was this test performed?  
   YES     NO 
How much have you paid 
for tests? 
 
Why not? 
   Lack of money  
   No lab 
 
Continue to 
question 11 
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I paid 
￿￿￿￿ 
   I don’t 
know 
 
  For 
the 
total 
In part 
   Lab closed  
Test not available 
   Other  ￿￿￿￿￿.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.   Were medicines prescribed?  
   YES    NO  
12.   Have you obtained the medicines prescribed? 
   YES, all      A part of the 
medicines 
 
   NO, none 
Where did you 
obtain the medicines 
prescribed? 
Only one reply 
possible  
Why did you not 
obtain the medicines 
prescribed? 
Only one reply possible
Why did you not 
obtain medicines 
prescribed? 
Only one reply 
possible 
 
Continue 
to 
question 
13 
 
   1. Same health 
centre  
   2. Other health 
structure (HC / 
Hospital) 
   3. Pharmacy 
   4. Market 
   5. Other (specify) 
￿￿￿￿￿￿.. 
 
   1. Lack of money 
   2. Doctors not
available at the HC 
   3. Medicines not
available elsewhere
(pharmacy, market) 
   4. Other 
(specify)￿￿￿￿
￿￿ 
 
   1. Lack of 
money 
   2. Medicines 
not available at 
the HC 
   3. Medicines 
not available 
elsewhere 
(pharmacy, 
market) 
   4. Other 
(specify) 
￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 
 
 
How much did you 
pay for medicines? 
 
How much did you 
pay for medicines? 
 
  
  
  
  
I 
paid: 
￿￿￿... 
   I 
don’t 
know 
 
   For 
the 
total 
In 
part 
 
 
I 
paid: 
￿￿￿...
   I don’t 
know 
 
   For 
the 
total 
In 
part 
 
 
 
Continue to 
question 13 
 
 
 
13.   Were there are costs incurred in obtaining care? (transport, etc ……….…) 
   YES  for ………………………………    NO
 How much extra did you pay? 
  ……………………….
   I don’t know 
 
Continue to question 14 
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14.   How did you obtain the 
money to pay for care? 
 
Several possible replies so tick 
all them and circle the 
principal one 
 
   1. Taken out of household savings 
   2. Sale of land 
   3. Sale of a cow 
   4. Sale of (a part of) the harvest 
   5. Sale of a future harvest 
6. Extra work for somebody else as a 
labourer 
   7. Cut back on expenditure 
   8. Borrowed from somebody 
   9. Debt incurred at the health centre 
   10. The care was free 
   11. Other (specify) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
VI.  SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
15.   Do you have a paper 
giving you a reduction on 
the cost of care, or free 
care? 
 
   1. Sickness insurance card (CAM) 
   2. Insurance card for state employees (FP) 
   3. ’Poverty card’ (given by the commune) 
   4. Soldiers or families of soldiers 
   5. Other  (repatriated by the UNHCR, parish 
certificate, health personnel, etc.) 
   6. No 
16.   Does the family 
present any of the 
following signs of 
vulnerability?  
 
Read the replies and 
tick for each one 
 
 
  Yes   No 
    □         1. Female head of household, with responsibility for 
children 
    □        2. Female head of household, with no responsibility 
for children 
 
    □        3. Children (below 18 years) as head of household 
with no outside assistance 
    □        4. Elderly person(s) (over 55 years), isolated or 
with responsibility for children 
    □        5. Somebody without land 
    □        6. Somebody unable to access his/her land 
    □        7. Displaced 
    □        8. Repatriated 
    □        9. Handicapped person in the care of the family 
    □       10. Chronically ill person in the care of the family 
(AIDS, diabetes, tuberculosis, cancer, mental, illness, 
etc.) 
             □ 11. None of the above 
 
17.   In what socio-
economic category 
would you place your 
household? 
(only one reply) 
 
   1. Requiring perpetual assistance 
   2. Very poor 
   3. Poor 
   4. Slightly well-off 
   5. Rich   80
  
  
  
  
  
18.   If you have school-
age children, how much 
do you spend for one 
year of schooling? 
 
 
   …………………….. 
For some of the children 
For all of the children 
Not attending school 
Free 
Not applicable 
19. What sort of house 
do you live in? 
 
   1. Hut 
   2. Adobe house 
   3. House made out of adobe bricks 
   4. House made out of burnt bricks 
   5. Provisional housing (sheeting, etc.) 
21. Concerning your 
house ￿ 
 
   1. Owner 
   2. Tenant 
   3. Site for the displaced 
   4. Other (specify) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.. 
 
21. Do you own a piece of 
land? 
Read out the replies. 
 
   1. Yes, land cultivated for the household’s survival 
   2. Yes, land cultivated for profit 
   3. Yes, a large piece of land for profit, with 
labourers employed 
   4. No 
22. Do you own any of 
the following 
animals and how 
many? 
 
   1. Hens 
   2. Goat 
   3. Cow 
   4. Pig 
   5. None 
23. How much money 
does the household 
spend per week? 
Calculate together 
 
   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
24. How much money 
does the household 
earn per week? 
Calculate together 
 
   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 Annex 3: User survey at the exit of the health centre (Burundi exit survey) 
 
Date: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Interviewer: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.. Code: 
 
 HC: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.  Sector: ￿￿￿￿.￿ Commune: ￿￿￿￿￿.. Province: 
￿￿￿￿￿. 
 
Brief explanation of the survey: Hello, we are studying the health care in the province and we 
would like to speak to you for a moment about the care that you have received. Could you spare 
us a few minutes? This information will remain confidential and your name will not appear 
anywhere. Let’s move off a little way to the side to talk together. 
 
1.  Information about the patient: 
Age: ￿￿￿￿￿￿ years ￿￿￿￿￿.. months   gender:  
  M/F 
 
2.  Information about the person interviewed, if different from the patient: 
Age: ￿￿￿￿..￿..  years    Gender  
 M/F 
 
3.  Where do you live?        Hill:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.         Commune: 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
     The hill is in this HC's catchment area? (The interviewer should check this) 
        
   Yes     No 
                                                                         
4.  How long did it take you to reach the HC from leaving your home? 
 
￿￿￿..￿.. hours  ￿￿￿..￿.. minutes
 
 
5.  Did you pay for transport from your home to the  HC today (one way)? 
￿￿￿..￿.. Fbu
 
6.  How long did you have to wait before seeing the consultant? 
 
￿￿￿..￿.. hours  ￿￿￿..￿.. minutes
 
7.  What was the health problem for which you consulted?  
(What did you feel before going to the HC?) Explain: this information will remain 
confidential. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.. 
8.  Did you regard this health problem as (tick the appropriate reply): 
 
   Not serious     Serious     Very serious 
 
9.   Was the patient's temperature taken?  
 
   Yes     No 
 
10.  Was an examination made of the part of the body affected by the illness? 
  81
   82
   Yes     No     Not Applicable  
 
11.  For children under 5 years: were you asked to show the vaccination card? 
 
   Yes     No     Not Applicable  
 
12.  What diagnosis was made at the HC? (What did they find at the HC?) 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
   Information not yet available 
   I don’t know 
 
 
13. What  treatment  (medicines and dosage) was prescribed at the HC? 
(Check the prescription, if available) 
 
  Medicine  Dosage and duration   
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
   Information 
not available 
 
14.   Verification of the medicines and whether the treatment was complete 
(keep the same numbering): 
 
  Indicate whether the medicine 
was received 
(Yes / No) 
Dosage and duration as indicated?  
(Yes / No) 
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
 
15.  If an answer is NO, Why was the treatment not completed? 
 
(Tick the reply closest to the answer received)   [] Out of stock / medicine nor available 
    []  Cost  too  high; I could only pay for 
part of it 
[] Cost too high; I didn’t receive any 
more credit 
[] That’s how they usually do it here at 
the HC 
[] I don’t know 
[] Other reason (specify). 
 
16.  Do you know what tariff-setting system is in place or the usual price at 
the HC? 
 
   Yes     No 
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Check if the patient's reply corresponds to the system in place: (for the 
interviewer to verify) 
 
   Correct (corresponds)     False explanation (does not 
correspond) 
   84
 
17.  What price did you pay today at the health centre? 
 
Already paid?     
Price (BuF) 
YES NO Part 
Price of the card/ registration 
sheet: 
      
Price of the consultation:         
Price of the medicines (total):         
Price of the lab:         
Price of other care or medical acts:         
 
Put a dash if you 
don't know 
Total (Fbu)    
 
 
18.  Do you have the right to a price reduction or to free care?  
 
   Yes     No 
 
If yes, which? (Verify the different possibilities listed below) 
 
  Yes  No 
CAM    
’indigence card’ (commune)     
Certificate proving holder is displaced/ 
repatriated/victim of a disaster 
  
State employees’ insurance (mutuelle) card     
Soldier or soldier’s family     
Health personnel     
Other: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
  
 
19.  Did you receive a price reduction here at the centre? 
 
   Yes     No 
   For medicines?   
   For medical acts?   
   For other care?   
   On the total?   
 
20.  As regards the price that you paid today, was it difficult for you to pay this? 
 
   Yes     No 
⇓ 
Continue to question 21 
⇓ 
Continue to question 23 
 
21.  How is it that you have difficulty in paying today? Why? 
(Tick the reply closest to the answer given) 
   I don’t earn enough (in general)     The price of care is too high 
 
   I already spent a lot of money for this illness 
episode before coming to the HC 
   Several household members are ill 
   Too many expenses in other areas at the 
moment (school fees, seeds, etc.) 
    I have a temporary money 
problem (season, etc.) 
   Other: ￿￿   
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22.  If you have difficulty in paying the HC, what are you going to do to find a 
solution? (Tick the reply closest to the answer given)  
   Nothing    
   I’m going to ask for money from the 
family/neighbours/￿ 
   I am going to sell some bananas (or 
some other crop) 
   I’m going to create a debt at the HC     I’m going to sell a unit of livestock  
   I’m going to work in the field      I’m going to sell a piece of land  
   I’m going to work elsewhere  
State where: ￿. 
   I’m going to sell something else  
State what: ￿￿ 
   I’m going to reduce other expenditure 
State what: ￿￿.. 
   Other: ￿. 
 
23.  Do you regard yourself as: 
 
   Well-off      Poor 
   Average     Very poor 
 
24. How much do you spend every week on average? (calculate the total together, if 
necessary) 
 
￿￿￿..￿.. Fbu
 
25.  How much do you earn per week? (calculate the total together, if necessary) 
￿￿￿..￿.. Fbu
 
26.  Are you satisfied with the care received today? 
 
   Very satisfied     Not satisfied  
   Satisfied      Not at all satisfied 
 
27.  Will you return to this HC the next time that you or one of your family 
is ill? 
 
   Yes     No     I don’t know  
 
28.  Explain the principal reasons for this choice: why or why not? 
 (Only tick the most important reason given) 
 
Why? Why  not? 
   I am satisfied with the care     I am not satisfied with the care 
   I am satisfied with the reception     I am not satisfied with the reception 
   The service was rapid     There was a very long wait 
   The price is not too expensive     The price is too expensive 
   I prefer the care given here for 
this type of illness 
   I prefer the care given elsewhere for 
this type of illness 
   I don’t know any other HC where 
I can get care 
   I know another HC where I can get 
care 
   Other (specify): ￿￿￿     Other (specify): ￿￿￿ 
 
   I don’t know 
 
Annex 4: Information to be gathered at the focal HC for the cluster concerned 
   86
Province: Commune: 
HC at:  Cluster No.: 
Date: Interviewer: 
 
1.  Management of the HC:        public/ private, state-approved / 
other: ￿.. 
 
2.  Supported by:  ￿￿￿￿￿       in terms of ￿￿￿. 
￿￿￿￿￿.    in  terms  of  ￿￿￿. 
 
3.  Catchment population:  
 
4.  Tariff-setting system  (specify whether this applies for medicines, the lab 
and medical acts) 
a.  Presently in place: ￿￿￿￿. 
b. Since:  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
c.  What was the system prior to this date: ￿￿￿￿￿.. 
d. Any  remarks:    ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
5.  Average number of curative consultations per month 
a. Total  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
b.  Children < 5 years / adults ￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
c. Men/women￿￿￿￿./￿￿￿￿￿.. 
d. Remarks:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
e.  Add together the monthly attendance figures for 2002 and 2003 
(total)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
6.  Average number of measles vaccinations per month 
a.  Total n￿ of children < 1 year (target group) 
b.  Total n￿ of children < 1 year vaccinated against measles 
c. Remarks: 
d.  Add together the monthly measles vaccination figures for 2002 and 
2003. 
 
7.  Check in the register for the past 5 days: 
  Number  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Average  % 
1  The total number of 
curative consultations 
       100 
2  The number of patients 
with a CAM card 
        
3  The number of patients 
holding proof of poverty 
        
4  The number of patients 
with a MFP card 
        
5  The number of military 
patients 
        
6  The number of health 
personnel patients (and 
family) 
        
7  The number of patients 
who take on a debt to the 
HC 
        
 
8. Availability  of  medicines,  medical material and other input:   87
a.  Stock  of  ASA  500  mg      yes/no 
b.  Stock of quinine 300 mg        yes/no 
c.  Stock  of  amoxicillin      yes/no 
d.  Stock  of  co-trimoxazole     yes/no 
e.  Stock  of  ORS       yes/no 
f.  Availability of paracheck or reagent for thick drop  yes/no 
g.  Availability of RPR test in the ANC    yes/no 
h.  Disinfectant in the treatment room      yes/no 
i.  Stock  of  measles  vaccines     yes/no 
j.  Stock of ferrosulphate and folic acid in the ANC       yes/no 
 
9.  Check in the register and give a score of 1 to 5: 
a.  Treatment for a child with diarrhoea 
b.  Treatment for a child with a respiratory condition 
c.  Treatment for an adult with malaria 
d.  Treatment for a child with malaria 
e.  Treatment for a sexually transmitted infection (STI) 
 
10. Other quality indicators for curative consultations: 
a.  Level of professional qualification of the consultant: MD/ nurse A1/ 
nurse A2 / auxiliary 
b.  Possibility of thick blood smear or paracheck: yes/no 
c.  The opening hours of the HC:  from ￿￿ to ￿￿ 
 
11. Observation of the consultation:  
1)  Quality of the reception and triage: priority given to dehydrated or 
feverish children:     yes/no 
2)  Consultation conducted with as much confidentiality as possible 
(privacy):      yes/no 
3)  Temperature taken systematically before or during the curative 
consultation:    yes/no 
4)  Time the length of the consultation (from the moment that the patient 
and the consultant are sitting until of one of them leaves):  
￿￿￿min￿￿.sec 
 
 
Give the names of the hills or sites served by the HC: 
1)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
2)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
3)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
4)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
5)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
6)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
7)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
   88
 
 Annexe 5:  Example of a comparison exercise of the total price to be paid by patients 
in the different health centres of the province of Cankuzo. 
 
 
In order to compare the price that patients are asked to pay in health centres with different tariff-
setting systems, we add r the total costs to be paid by patients for identical pathologies and 
according to the care protocols presently employed. A detailed calculation of the ’theoretical’ prices 
to be paid according to the ’type’ of patient is presented. It is calculated on the basis of the price of 
the different elements that contribute to the total price for the care required for current pathologies. 
We focused the exercise on: 
•  An out-patient suspected of malaria requiring treatment with oral quinine; 
•  A patient requiring hospitalisation (3 days) and perfusion of quinine for serious 
malaria; 
•  A normal delivery (eutocic) with  2 nights staying at the HC. 
 
In the table, you will also find the price to be paid by patients holding any kind of card 
qualifying them for subsidised care (CAM, ’indigence card’, FP card), according to the current 
system found in the field. The results are presented in the following tables: 
 
1.  Out-patient (NC) suspected of malaria (this includes: patient card or sheet, 
consultation with a paramedical, thick blood smear test, treatment by 21 oral quinine tablets, 
500 mg). 
Price (Fbu) to be paid by the 
patient for malaria (out-
patient, quinine) 
Non-
subsidised 
patient 
’Indigence 
card’ 
CAM 
card 
Insurance civil 
servants (mutuelle 
FP card) 
  Public HC at 115% cost 
recovery 
1.666  1.256 1.666  1.666 
  Public HC at 20% cost 
recovery (Cankuzo Town) 
628  0 628  300 
 Flat fee public HC (MSF)  50  0 50  50 
  Private religious  HC (CR at 
150%) 
1.868  1.868 1.868  374 
 
2.  Malaria patient requiring a perfusion and three days of hospitalisation (this 
includes the patient  sheet, thick blood smear test, treatment by a perfusion of glucose, 5%, with 
vial of quinine (3 perfusions per day for 2 days) and the medical acts, such as the consultation 
with paramedical personnel during the daily round or putting in the intravenous drip line). 
Malaria, quinine, 
hospitalised for 3 days 
Non-subsidised 
patient 
’Indigence 
card’ 
CAM 
card 
Insurance civil 
servants(mutuelle) 
card FP 
 Public HC at 115% CR  8.307  0 7.899  7.899 
 Public HC at 20% CR 
(Cankuzo    Town) 
1.866  0 1866  1866 
 Flat fee public HC (MSF)  250  0 250  250 
 Private religious HC (CR 
at 150%) 
9.600  9.600 9.600  1.920 
 
3.  A normal delivery (this includes the act of delivery, an injection of methergine 
postpartum, necessary material, such as gloves, syringe and needle and overnight stay for 2 
days). 
Eutocic delivery  Non-
subsidised 
patient 
’Indigence 
card’ 
CAM card  Insurance 
civil 
servants 
(Carte 
mutuelle FP 
 Public HC at 115% CR  1.291  0 698  698 
  Public HC at 20% CR 698  0 698  258   89
(Cankuzo  Town) 
 Flat fee public HC (MSF)  150  0 150  150 
 Private religious HC (CR at   
150%) 
2.812  2.812 2.812 562 
 
Of course, we immediately see the large difference in prices between the public and private 
religious-run  health centres: the latter remain the most expensive. But even in a public 
health centre with cost-recovery at 115%, this price remains high: a quinine treatment for an 
out-patient costs about 1.600 Fbu and a patient with severe malaria leaves after 3 days of 
hospitalisation with a bill of over 8.300 Fbu. A normal delivery (without any intervention 
whatsoever, only ensuring correct monitoring) costs around 1.300 Fbu.  
 
 
 